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TOP SECRET

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FILE TITLE: LIBYA	SERIES RELATIONS
	PART: 2A
PART BEGINS:	PART ENDS:
	CAB ONE:

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TOP SECRET

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Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
JIC(84)(IA) 17	18/04/1984

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray Date 26/9/2013

PREM Records Team

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AJC –

(i) Please see letter below.

(ii) At the flap, is a letter from AB to Roger Bone, dated 24/4/84, about a letter from the Secretary General of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya. FCO do not consider a reply necessary. Content?

Yes

CST 2/5/84.

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c/f to keep?

FILE

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From the Private Secretary

24 April, 1984

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from the Secretary General of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya. This letter has not been acknowledged from here and I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to receive a suitable reply.

(David Barclay)

R. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الجبهة الوطنية لإنقاذ ليبيا

The National Front for the Salvation of Libya

April 20th, 1984

The Right Honourable Margaret Thather M.P.

On behalf of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, I would like to express our absolute and utter condemnation and horror for theoshooting at Libyan demonstrators and members of the British police force on Tuesday, April 17,1984 , in front of the Libyan People's Bureau formerly the Libyan embassy, in which WP-c Yvonne Fletcher lost her life and eleven innocent , peaceful Libyans were injured.

We urge you and your governemnet to take the most firm and strict measures to see that the perpetrators of this hienous crime are brought to justice. You must have no doubt whatsoever that it was a deliberate and premeditated act , sanctioned and approved by Gaddafi personally and by his regime. Gaddafi's aggressive designs towards Britain and direct threats to your government are well publicised . His assertions that his mission in London does not constitute an embassy with diplomatic status are wellknown. His representatives in London are the socalled 'revolutionary committees' who neither recognise nor respect any diplomatic norms or internationally agreed conventions and agreements.

We have only the highest praise and admiration for the British forces for the swift and efficient manner in which they handled the situation and contained the outrage, and our deepest sympathies go to WP-c Fletcher's family and colleagues.

We are confident that your governemnt will deal with this barbaric atrocity and with Gaddafi's terrorist squads in Britain in accordance with Britain's great traditions of justice and respect for freedom and the sanctity of human life.

MOHAMED YUSEF MAGARIAF- Secretary General, NFSL

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Subject to matter

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15

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 April 1984

I attach a record of the conversation between the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister, which followed this morning's meeting of COBRA.

I should be grateful if you could provide a note as soon as possible which deals with the Prime Minister's enquiries, recorded in the last paragraph of the record.

BF

David Barclay

Michael Partridge Esq

SECRET

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RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE HOME SECRETARY AT 1145 HRS ON TUESDAY, 24 APRIL, 1984

The Home Secretary reported the position as at the end of the meeting of COBRA that morning. The Modalities Committee was engaged in detailed talks with Fitouri, and these seemed to be going well. However, the Libyan emissary Shaibi was expected to arrive in London shortly. It was not yet clear how much of the progress made with Fitouri might then have to be re-negotiated. The Foreign Office were preparing to hand Shaibi a note on his arrival giving details of the various breaches of the Vienna Convention which had already occurred in Tripoli. Our Ambassador in Tripoli would be asked to explore the possibility of some early departures, thus underlining the independent right of our diplomats under the Vienna Convention to leave Libya when they please. The Prime Minister strongly supported the idea of bringing home some of our people from Tripoli before the weekend deadline.

The Home Secretary said thatit would be necessary before long to decide whether to allow the Libyans to establish an interest section in the Embassy of their protecting power (assuming that they wished to appoint one). We could expect the Libyans to insist on such an arrangement if we in our turn wanted British consular staff to work in the Italian Embassy in Tripoli. Given other pressures on the Italians, and the size of the British community in Libya, this was highly desirable.

/The question

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The question arose whether we might agree to the Libyans appointing members of their existing diplomatic staff. The Prime Minister said that a final decision on this could be deferred until the Libyans had put a specific proposition to us; but it would certainly be essential that any continuing Libyan representatives should be acceptable to us on security grounds, and should have had nothing to do either with the incident at the Libyan People's Bureau or with any of the bombings.

The Home Secretary explained what was proposed in relation to the arrest of Matuk. The Prime Minister agreed that it would be a good idea to seek to trade his deportation for the return of Ledingham.

The Prime Minister asked for further information on the following points:-

(i) what arrangements had so far been made to fly our people out of Tripoli?

(ii) had appropriate arrangements been made to cater for the possibility that some or all of the occupants of the Libyan People's Bureau might wish to leave before Sunday (planes, escort cars etc.) ?

(iii) how was it proposed to deal with the diplomat whose daughter had leukaemia - was it for example envisaged that the

/daughter

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daughter would remain in the United Kingdom after Sunday, or be transported home?

DMB

24 April, 1984

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14806 - 1

ZZ TRIPOLI
DD 250700Z ROME
GRS 359
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 250700Z ROME
FM FCO 241800Z APR 84
TO FLASH TRIPOLI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 200 OF 24 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE ROME
INTERESTS SECTIONS

Prime Minister

MT

1. MINISTERS HAVE NOW AGREED THAT THE LIBYANS MAY BE ALLOWED TO MAINTAIN AN INTERESTS SECTION IN THE EMBASSY OF AN ACCEPTABLE PROTECTING POWER IN LONDON. WE STILL AWAIT LIBYAN PROPOSALS ON THE LATTER POINT.

2. THIS AGREEMENT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS. THE INTEREST SECTION COULD BE STAFFED BY A MAXIMUM OF TWO LIBYAN OFFICIALS WITH DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY, ONE FOR CONSULAR AND ONE FOR CULTURAL/EDUCATIONAL WORK. THESE TWO OFFICIALS COULD NOT (NOT) BE CHOSEN FROM THOSE PEOPLE WHO WERE PRESENT IN THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU (LPB) ON 17 APRIL, NOR FROM PEOPLE AGAINST WHOM THERE IS EVIDENCE OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE RECENT BOMB ATTACKS. WE WOULD EXPECT TO SEE IN ADVANCE DETAILS OF THEIR CANDIDATES, WHOSE ACCEPTANCE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION FROM US. MINISTERS HAVE NOT YET DECIDED WHAT TO DO IF THE LIBYANS PROPOSE OFFICIALS IN THE UK BUT NOT THE LPB ON 17 APRIL EG ZLITNI AND FITOURI. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, ALTHOUGH FITOURI WAS NOT IN THE LPB ON 17 APRIL WE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT HIM: AS THE ACTING LIBYAN REPRESENTATIVE THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS HIS CONTINUED PRESENCE IN LONDON AFTER THE BREAK WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD BY PARLIAMENT OR PUBLIC OPINION HERE. THOSE OFFICIALS WE ACCEPT COULD OF COURSE BE REPLACED IN THE NORMAL WAY AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR SUCCESSORS WOULD ALSO BE SUBJECT TO EXPLICIT CONFIRMATION.

3. THE ABOVE IS NATURALLY ON THE BASIS THAT WE ARE CONCEDED SIMILAR FACILITIES TO WORK UNDER THE ITALIAN FLAG IN TRIPOLI.

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4. WE HAVE NOT (NOT) YET DECIDED ON WHOM WE SHOULD APPOINT TO THE TWO POSTS IN THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION IN THE ITALIAN EMBASSY IN TRIPOLI. WE ARE CONSIDERING THIS URGENTLY.

5. SINCE THIS IS A MATTER OF INTEREST TO THE LIBYANS WHO HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR DESIRE FOR A FAVOURABLE ANSWER YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO NEGOTIATE IT WITH THE LIBYAN AUTHORITIES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ELICIT SOMETHING YOU NEED IN EXCHANGE, EG LIBYAN AGREEMENT TO THE DEPARTURE OF AN ADVANCE GROUP OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (OUR TELEGRAM NO 196).

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ZZ TRIPOLI
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FM FCO 241345Z APR 84
TO FLASH TRIPOLI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 196 OF 24 APR 84
AND INFO IMMEDIATE ROME
YOUR TELNO 228: SPURIOUS RECIPROCITY ON DEPARTURE
ARRANGEMENTS

Prime Minister

1. MINISTERS FIRMLY REJECT THE LIBYAN ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE OSTENSIBLE RECIPROCITY IN THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TIMING OF THE DEPARTURES FROM YOUR EMBASSY AND LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU, AS FOR EXAMPLE SUGGESTED BY JERBI IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR (2 PLANES TO LEAVE FROM EACH CAPITAL SIMULTANEOUSLY, AND PROBABLY VERY NEAR TO 20/30 APRIL DEADLINE).

2. IN THE MODALITIES COMMITTEE HERE ON 24 APRIL, FITOURI SAID THAT AS HIS OVERALL TOTAL TO BE EVACUATED IS NOW 197, IE MORE THAN ONE PLANE LOAD, HE MIGHT NEED TO SEND SOME WOMEN AND CHILDREN BY COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO. HE SAID HE MIGHT ALSO WANT SOME OF HIS OFFICIALS TO LEAVE BEFORE SUNDAY TO ACT AS COURIERS, ETC. WE INDICATED THAT LIBYAN WIVES AND CHILDREN, AND ALL DIPLOMATIC STAFF FROM BUILDINGS OTHER THAN THE THE LPB WERE FREE TO LEAVE BRITAIN AT ANY TIME.

3. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PROBLEMS SPELT OUT IN YOUR TUR, PLUS THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF FINALISING ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE ITALIANS QUICKLY WE MUST ASSUME THAT A TOTAL EVACUATION WILL NOT (NOT) BE POSSIBLE MUCH BEFORE THE DEADLINE. PLEASE THEREFORE SEEK AN EARLY APPOINTMENT WITH THE FLB AND INFORM THEM THAT WE WOULD LIKE A PARTY CONSISTING OF EMBASSY WIVES, CHILDREN AND FEMALE DIPLOMATIC STAFF TO LEAVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND IN ANY CASE NOT LATER THAN THURSDAY EVENING, 26 APRIL (SUBJECT TO AVAILABILITY OF BOOKINGS ETC). YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO INCLUDE A NUMBER OF MALE STAFF IN THIS

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ADVANCE PARTY IF YOU SEE FIT.

4. IT MAY WELL BE THAT THE LIBYANS WILL REFUSE PERMISSION FOR ANY OR ALL OF THE ABOVE GROUP TO LEAVE, AND/OR THAT THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF ASSEMBLING A PARTY IN TIME (GIVEN THE DIFFICULTIES MENTIONED IN PARA 5 OF YOUR TUR) WILL PROVE INSUPERABLE. BUT IF THIS IS LARGELY BECAUSE OF LIBYAN OBSTRUCTIONISM, WE SHOULD LIKE TO BE IN A POSITION TO BE ABLE TO SAY SO PUBLICLY AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT. WE SHALL ALSO REMONSTRATE WITH AL-SHAIBI WHEN WE TACKLE HIM INTER ALIA ON THE DENIAL OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT TO YOUR STAFF.

HOWE

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FROM FCO 241130Z APR 84
TO FLASH TRIPOLI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 194 OF 24 APR 84
YOUR TELNO 227 LIBYA CRISIS

Prime Minister

1. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE FOR BAGHDADI TO BE DEPORTED ON THIS AFTERNOON'S LAA FLIGHT. WE ARE URGENTLY CONSIDERING HOW TO HANDLE YOUR SUGGESTION FOR TRADING MATUQ FOR LEDINGHAM. THE HOME OFFICE WILL SHORTLY ANNOUNCE THAT MATUQ HAS BEEN DETAINED UNDER THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT.

2. THE DELICACY OF PLAYING THIS CARD IS THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF KEEPING MATUQ FOR MORE THAN A SHORT PERIOD AND HE WILL BE DEPORTED ALONG WITH THE REST. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW.

MT

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FM FCO 241500Z APR 84
TO FLASH TRIPOLI
TELEGRAM NUMBER 183 OF 24 APRIL
FROM EMERGENCY UNIT
INTERESTS SECTIONS

Prime Minister

1. MINISTERS HAVE REACHED A POSITIVE DECISION AND DETAILS WILL BE TELEGRAPHED TO YOU URGENTLY AS SOON AS THEY ARE FULLY CLEAR HERE. MEANWHILE YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO USE THIS FACT WITH JERBI FOR GREATER LEVERAGE IN SECURING LIBYAN AGREEMENT TO THE DEPARTURE FROM TRIPOLI OF AN ADVANCE PARTY PERHAPS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

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CHIEF CLERK
MR WHITE
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

Prime Minister

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FM TRIPOLI 241425Z APR
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 230 OF 24/4/84
AND TO IMMEDIATE ROME

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ANGLO-LIBYAN RELATIONS.

1. WILLEY OF THE BBC TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE WAS APPROACHED CONFIDENTIALLY LAST NIGHT BY KHALIFA AZZABI (EXPELLED FROM THE PB IN 198 AND NOW QADHAFI'S ENGLISH INTERPRETER BUT NOT IN MY OPINION A BAD EGG). AZZABI TOLD HIM THAT QADHAFI HAD DECIDED THAT, IF THE BRITISH POLICE ENTERED THE PB AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF LIBYAN STAFF, WHICH WOULD BE AN INCURSION INTO LIBYAN TERRITORY, THE LIBYANS WOULD BURN DOWN THIS EMBASSY. IN ANY CASE THEY WANTED TO GET US OUT FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT OVERLOOKING THE NAVAL BASE.

2. WILLEY SAID HE HAD ALSO BRIEFED MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE, WHOSE REACTION WAS THAT THIS WAS NOT VERY LIKELY SINCE BURNING THE FRENCH EMBASSY COST THE LIBYANS ABOUT 10 MILLION DOLLARS. BUT QUARONI SAID HE HAD BETTER GET THE ITALIAN FLAG UP QUICKLY SO THAT THEY WOULD AT LEAST HAVE SOMETHING TO BURN.

3. QUARONI 'S OPINION IS NOT TO BE DISREGARDED, BUT FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS DID NOT KEEP THEM AWAY FROM THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY LAST MONTH. THE REFERENCE TO THE PB AS LIBYAN TERRITORY GOES BACK TO QADHAFI'S RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE.

4. TRAIKI HAS TOLD AFP THAT IF BRITISH SOLDIERS/POLICE ENTER THE PB, THE LIBYANS WILL FOLLOW SUIT HERE.

MILES

[Typist 44]

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MR WRIGHT
MR EGERTON
MR ADAMS
SIR J LEAHY
CHIEF CLERK
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MR FREELAND } LEGAL ADVISERS
MRS DENZA }

Prime Minister

On x overleaf, FCO are proposing to agree to not more than two in their interest section. This is enough for our purposes in Tripoli.

Further instructions are being sent stressing our right to accept or reject their candidates. The other points made at your meeting this morning are being passed on.

24/4

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FM TRIPOLI 241340Z APR
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 229 OF 24/4/84
AND TO IMMEDIATE ROME, KUWAIT, ACCRA.

MY TELNO 228: PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

1. WE INCH FORWARD.

2. I SAW JERBI AGAIN AT 1300 LOCAL. HE AGREED TO 5B (PAPERWORK IS GOING AHEAD) AND 5 D. HE SAID WE MUST BE PATIENT ON 5A, MAYBE TILL THIS AFTERNOON, AND 5E. 5C (STAFF OR FAMILIES TO LEAVE INDIVIDUALLY) WAS REJECTED.

3. I TOLD HIM THIS WAS CONTRARY TO THE VIENNA CONVENTION, THE PRINCIPAL OF RECIPROCITY, DR TRAIKI'S UNDERTAKING TO ME, COMMON HUMANITY, ARAB CUSTOM ETC. I POINTED OUT THAT I HAD TOLD THE WORLD PRESS THAT MY WIFE AND CHILDREN LEAVE ON THURSDAY. HE COULD GIVE NO EXPLANATION FOR HIS INSTRUCTIONS AND I TOLD HIM TO THINK AGAIN. I HAVE SINCE TOLD HIM THAT FITURI ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED AGREEMENT OF JUST THIS IN THE FCO THIS MORNING.

4. DAVIES IS NOW FREE TO MOVE AND HE AND COOLING ARE TO CHANGE PLACES (COOLING GOING HOME) THIS AFTERNOON. ANDERSON'S DAUGHTER (AND NANNY) WENT TO THE AIRPORT AGAIN TODAY,AFTER A COMPLICATED NEGOTIATION INVOLVING BOTH ASMAH AND MUHANNA. THEY WERE TURNED BACK AGAIN. ASMAH PARTICULARLY HAS GOT HIS TEETH INTO THIS ONE.

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INTO THIS ONE.

5. JERBI'S REASON FOR CALLING ME WAS TO TELL ME THAT THE LIBYANS AGREED TO THE PROPOSAL IN MY NOTE OF 22 APRIL ABOUT BN INTERESTS SECTION. HE SAID THIS COMMUNICATION WAS OFFICIAL BUT I ASKED HIM FOR A WRITTEN NOTE. THE LIBYANS PROPOSED THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD RETAIN 3 OFFICIALS , WHO MIGHT BE EITHER FORMER MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OR NEW.HE PRESSED ME FOR A REPLY SOON, PREFERABLY TODAY. BUT HE WAS STILL UNABLE TO TELL ME ANYTHING ABOUT THE LIBYAN POSITION ON A PROTECTING POWER EITHER FOR US OR FOR THEM. FROM WHAT HE IS TELLING THE PRESS, A DECISION ON THIS MAY NOT BE FOR SOME TIME.

6. AS I LEFT, I TOLD HIM THAT I BELIEVED BAGHDADI HAD BEEN RELEASED TODAY. IT WOULD MAKE AN EXCELLENT IMPRESSION IF LEDINGHAM COULD BE ON THE FLIGHT WITH SHAIBI THIS AFTERNOON. JERBI SAID HE DID NOT THINK IT COULD BE DONE BUT HE WOULD PASS THE IDEA ON.

7. I HAVE SINCE RUNG JERBI TO TELL HIM THAT WE AGREE TO SHAIBI'S ARRIVAL ON THE B-CAL FLIGHT TODAY WITH TWO (2) COMPANIONS.

MILES

NNNN

[TYPISTS aa]

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FM TRIPOLI 240804Z APR
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 228 OF 24/4/84
INFO IMMEDIATE ROME KUWAIT ACCRA.

TELECON MILES/LONG: RECIPROCITY.

PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

1. THANK YOU FOR THIS INFORMATION, WHICH HAS STRENGTHENED MY HAND.

2. ACCOMPANIED BY NORTON, I ATTENDED A MEETING LAST NIGHT AT THE FLB CHAIRED BY JERBI.

3. HE ASKED THAT ALL STAFF SHOULD BE ALLOWED FROM PB TO PLANE WITHOUT SEARCH OR CUSTOMS. I SAID NO SEARCH OF BAGGAGE, BUT PERSONAL CHECK FOR WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES.HE SAID THEY WOULD SEND A SPECIAL PLANE, WITH OUR PERMISSION, AND SUGGESTED WE SHOULD DO THE SAME, BOTH TO TAKE OFF SIMULTANEOUSLY. I SAID THAT MIGHT NOT BE VERY PRACTICAL

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SHOULD DO THE SAME, BOTH TO TAKE OFF SIMULTANEOUSLY. I SAID THAT MIGHT NOT BE VERY PRACTICAL.

4. ON PROTECTING POWERS ALL HE COULD OFFER WAS THAT THE FLAGS MIGHT CHANGE ON 26 APRIL.

5. I REQUESTED:

A) PACKERS TO BE ADMITTED TO HOUSES AND FLATS, INCLUDING IN EMBASSY BUILDING.

B) PERMISSION TO SELL OR EXPORT PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL CARS.

C) STAFF OR FAMILIES TO BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE INDIVICUALLY, BY AIR OR OVERLAND.

D) MEMBERS OF STAFF NOW IN EMBASSY TO BE ALLOWED TO VISIT HOME AND RE ENTER EMBASSY.

E) THE SAME TO VISIT ITALIAN EMBASSY AND RETURN.

I EMPHASISED THAT ON ALLPOINTS ANSWER IN LONDON IS YES.

6. I SPOKE AS IN YOUR TELNO 191 ON SHAIBI. AS I LEFT, JERBI TOLD ME ABOUT BAGDADI , DESCRIBING HIM AS A DIPLOMAT. I CORRECTED HIM.

7. I RANG JERBI THIS MORNING. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION HE SAID THAT (A) NO DECISIONS AT ALL HAD BEEN TAKEN AND (B) IT WAS ABOUT TIME THEY WERE. I COMPLAINED THAT MY HOUSE TELEPHONE HAS AGAIN BEEN CUT AND THAT MY AO (DAVIES) IS NOT BEING ALLOWED TO LEAVE HIS HOUSE. I SAID THAT MY CONSUL'S DAUGHTER (NOT MY DAUGHTER INCIDENTLLY) WILL AGAIN TRY TO TAKE THE BCAL FLIGHT TODAY, ACCOMPANIED BY ONE OF MY OBSERVERS (MUHANNA, THOUGH I DID NOT SAY SO).

8. FINALLY I ASKED JERBI TO INFORM TRAIKI THAT IF I DO NOT GET A YES ON ALL POINTS VERY SOON I SHALL APPLY RECIPROCITY AND HAVE THE SAME RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED IN LONDON, ON CONSULAR AND COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS AND STAFF HOUSES AS WELL AS THE PB ITSELF.

9.POOR JERBI EXCLAM.

MILES

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TO F C O
TELNO 227 OF 24/4/83

YOUR TELNO 189: LIBYAN CRISIS.

1. BAGDADI COULD BE A CARD TO PLAY FOR LEDINGHAM. PLEASE CONSIDER MOST URGENTLY WHETHER DEPORTATION CAN BE DEFERRED 24 HOURS, SO THAT I CAN TRY MY LUCK.

2. JERBI TOLD ME LAST NIGHT OF THE ARREST OF SALIM MASUD MUHAMMAD, SALAH AL-DIN KHALIFA AND SA'D KHAMIS ''ON THEIR WAY TO THE CONSULATE''. WHO ARE THEY ?. IF THEY ARE CANDIDATES FOR DEPORTATION I HAVE A FULL HOUSE AND WILL TRY TO SEE THEM FOR MAXWELL TOO.

MILES

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GRS 230
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FM BONN 241510Z APR 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 404 OF 24 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE SOEUL (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

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LIBYA: GERMAN PRESS REACTION

1. HMG'S DECISION TO BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH LIBYA IS FRONT PAGE NEWS IN THE GERMAN PRESS TODAY. COMMENT GENERALLY SUPPORTS THE DECISION, WHICH IS SEEN AS UNAVOIDABLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HMG'S HANDLING OF THE SITUATION IS REGARDED AS BOTH WISE AND COURAGEOUS, BALANCING THE ''AFFRONT TO THE BRITISH SENSE OF JUSTICE'' OF LETTING A MURDERER GO FREE AGAINST THE MORALLY WORSE ALTERNATIVE OF USING FORCE AGAINST DIPLOMATIC PROPERTY AND STAFF.

2. GENSCHER'S PROPOSED VISIT TO LIBYA IS UNIVERSALLY BELIEVED TO BE INAPPROPRIATE AT PRESENT. SOME CONSERVATIVE PAPERS THINK THAT GERMANY'S ENTIRE RELATIONSHIP WITH LIBYA SHOULD BE REVIEWED. ONLY HANDELSBLATT, THE ECONOMIC DAILY, REMINDS ITS READERS THAT DEPENDENCE ON OIL FROM LIBYA (THE FRG'S SECOND LARGEST SUPPLIER) AND ON TRADE WITH LIBYA (GERMAN EXPORTS TO LIBYA ARE DOUBLE THOSE OF UK) MAKES IT HARDER FOR THE GERMANS TO CONSIDER BREAKING RELATIONS.

3. BRITAIN'S ACTION IS DESCRIBED BY SEVERAL COMMENTATORS AS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL CIVILISED COUNTRIES. OPINION IS HEAVILY IN FAVOUR OF ISOLATING REGIMES WHICH SUPPORT TERRORISM

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3. BRITAIN'S ACTION IS DESCRIBED BY SEVERAL COMMENTATORS AS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL CIVILISED COUNTRIES. OPINION IS HEAVILY IN FAVOUR OF ISOLATING REGIMES WHICH SUPPORT TERRORISM, AND THE ALLIANCE AND COMMUNITY ARE MENTIONED AS POSSIBLE FORA FOR CONCERTING ACTION. ONLY ONE COMMENTATOR TAKES A NEGATIVE VIEW, ARGUING THAT ATTEMPTS TO CONCERT ARE DOOMED TO FAIL GIVEN COMPETING INTERESTS AND THE COMMON ILLUSION THAT INCIDENTS LIKE THE LONDON SHOOTING ONLY HAPPEN TO ONE'S NEIGHBOUR.

4. THE LIBYAN PEOPLES' BUREAU IN BONN CIRCULATED TO ALL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ON 18 APRIL A NOTE VERBALE GIVING THEIR VERSION OF EVENTS IN LONDON. COPY BY BAG TO EMERGENCY UNIT.

TAYLOR

NNNN

SENT AT 241540Z

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

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FM BRUSSELS 241730Z APR 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 104 OF 24 APRIL

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MY TELNO 101: LIBYA

SUMMARY.

1. AT HIS MEETING WITH THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR IN THE MFA TODAY THE LIBYAN VICE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE LIBYANS WOULD CERTAINLY RESPECT THE VIENNA CONVENTION AS REGARDS OUR EMBASSY STAFF IN LIBYA. THEY WOULD ALSO RESPECT THE POSITION OF BRITISH NATIONALS REMAINING IN LIBYA. THEY HOPED RELATIONS COULD BE RESTORED IN DUE COURSE. THEY ALSO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE MATTER COULD BE REGARDED AS A BILATERAL ONE AND THAT THE TEN WOULD NOT FEEL IT NECESSARY TO PRONOUNCE ON IT. CAHEN DISCOURAGED THIS HOPE. I AM INFORMING THE MFA HOW LIBYAN TACTICS IN TRIPOLI BELIE SHAHATI'S ASSURANCES ABOUT TREATMENT OF OUR EMBASSY STAFF.

DETAIL

2. AFTER DISCUSSION WITH THE EMERGENCY UNIT I TOLD THE MFA THIS MORNING THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF CAHEN COULD FIND AN OPPORTUNITY DURING HIS MEETING WITH SHAHATI AND THE HEAD OF THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU HERE TO EMPHASISE THAT THE BELGIANS KNEW WE INTENDED TO OBSERVE THE VIENNA CONVENTION AS REGARDS THE LIBYANS IN LONDON AND HOPED THAT THE LIBYANS WOULD DO LIKE-WISE AS REGARDS OUR EMBASSY STAFF IN TRIPOLI.

3. CAHEN HAS NOW TELEPHONED ME TO SAY THAT HE MADE THIS POINT, EMPHASISING THAT IT WAS ALSO THE BELGIANS' EXPECTATION THAT THE LIBYANS WOULD OBSERVE THE CONVENTION. SHAHATI CONFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD. EL HOUDERI ADDED THAT THE LIBYANS HAD NOTHING AGAINST OUR EMBASSY STAFF AND THAT THEY MIGHT WELL LEAVE WITH THEIR ARMS'' FULL OF FLOWERS'' SHAHATI ALSO SAID THAT THE POSITION OF THE BRITISH REMAINING IN LIBYA WOULD ALSO BE RESPECTED.

4. CAHEN SAID THAT EARLIER SHAHATI HAD ARGUED THAT THE PRESENT

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OF FLOWERS'' SHAHATI ALSO SAID THAT THE POSITION OF THE BRITISH REMAINING IN LIBYA WOULD ALSO BE RESPECTED.

4. CAHEN SAID THAT EARLIER SHAHATI HAD ARGUED THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS ALL THE BRITISH FAULT. WE HAD NOT PROTECTED THE PEOPLE'S BUREAU ADEQUATELY AND THEY HAD TO PROTECT THEMSELVES. THE LIBYANS HAD SEEN THE PROBLEM COMING THROUGH OUR REFUSAL TO EXPEL THE DISSIDENTS. CAHEN HAD RESPONDED ROBUSTLY AND SAID THAT THE BELGIANS COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY PROVOCATION ON OUR SIDE. NOBODY COULD BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD HAVE WANTED TO PROVOKE THE DEATH OF OUR WOMAN POLICE CONSTABLE IN ORDER TO CREATE AN INCIDENT. THE BELGIANS ALSO QUITE UNDERSTOOD OUR LEGAL INABILITY TO EXPEL THE DISSIDENTS. THE BELGIANS WERE IN A SIMILAR POSITION EG OVER ZAIREAN DISSIDENTS HERE.(EL HOUDERI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS TRUE.) COLONEL QUADAFFI HIMSELF MUSAIMYOLHMLLJCRY SHOCKED TO HEAR OF THE SHOOTING.

5. CAHEN SAID THAT SHAHATI MORE OR LESS ACCEPTED THIS, THOUGH HE HOPED THAT THE BELGIANS WOULD NOT ADOPT THE BRITISH LINE EXCLUSIVELY. SHAHATI WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE LIBYANS WERE VERY SURPRISED AND UNHAPPY AT THE PRESENT SITUATION AND HOPED THAT RELATIONS COULD BE MENDED IN DUE COURSE. THEY COUNTED ON THE BELGIANS TO HELPDLQVFECE

OO

GGKKECTION.

6. SHAHATI RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENT (MY TELNO 102) AND SAID THEY HOPED THAT THE MATTER COULD BE REGARDED AS A BILATERAL PROBLEM. THEY WOULD LIKE THE TEN NOT TO ''GANG UP'' ON THE LIBYANS, JUST AS THEY THEMSELVES WERE NOT TRYING TO MAKE THE MATTER AN ARAB ISSUE. CAHEN DEFENDED THE BELGIAN STATEMENT AND SAID THAT AS FAR AS THE TEN WERE CONCERNED SOLIDARITY IN SUCH MATTERS WAS PARAMOUNT. SHAHATI AGAIN SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS.

7. CAHEN WILL EITHER LET ME HAVE A FULL RECORD OF THE DISCUSSION TOMORROW OR GIVE ONE TO SIR JULIAN BULLARD ON THURSDAY.

8. I THANKED HIM WARMLY FOR HIS SPIRITED RESPONSES AND SAID I KNEW THEY WOULD BE APPRECIATED IN LONDON. I AM FOLLOWING UP TO LET THE MFA KNOW HOW LIBYAN TACTICS IN TRIPOLI AS REGARDS OUR EMBASSY STAFF BELIE SHAHATI'S ASSURANCES.

9. FCO PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

JACKSON

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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 282 OF 24 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY TO KARACHI.

Prime Minister

LIBYAN CRISIS

1. THE US EMBASSY HERE HAS SHOWN US A COPY OF A NOTE OF 21 APRIL TO ALL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS (EXCEPT UK) BY THE LIBYAN PEOPLES BUREAU, TO WHCIH IS ATTACHED THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE FOREIGN LIAISON BUREAU IN TRIPOLI QUOTE CONCERNING THE BRITISH POLICE AGGRESSION ON LIBYAN PEOPLES BUREAU IN LONDON UNQUOTE. THE STATEMENT SETS OUT THE LIBYAN VERSION OF RECENT EVENTS AND CONCLUDES THAT QUOTE THE GRAVE ACTION OF THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES WILL NOT PASS WITHOUT RESPONSE FROM THE LIBYAN ARAB PEOPLE, WHO KNOW HOW TO RETALIATE IN A POSITION OF DEFENDING THEIR DIGNITY AND EXISTENCE UNQUOTE.

2. WE DOUBT IF THERE IS A PARTICULAR DANGER OF RETALIATION IN PAKISTAN. THE LIBYANS HERE ARE CLOSELY WATCHED. BUT WE ARE ASKING THE MFA TO TAKE SUCH ACTION AS THEY CONSIDER NECESSARY TO PROTECT BRITISH ESTABLISHMENTS AND PERSONNEL IN PAKISTAN FROM ANY POSSIBLE THREAT.
FORSTER

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
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LIBYAN CRISIS

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Prime Minister

The Home Secretary referred to this strangely soft line taken by the French.

DMB 24/4

GRS 220

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DESKBY 241100Z
FM PARIS 241030Z APR 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 488 OF 24 APRIL

TELECON JONES (MAED)/MACRAE : LIBYA : FRENCH PRECEDENTS

1. THE FACTS OF THE 1978 INCIDENT WHEN A MEMBER OF THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN PARIS KILLED A FRENCH POLICEMAN ARE AS FOLLOWS. THE INCIDENT AROSE FOLLOWING THE KILLING OF KALLAK, THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE. A GROUP OF PALESTINIANS BELIEVING IRAQ TO BE RESPONSIBLE TOOK HOSTAGES INSIDE THE IRAQI EMBASSY. THE FRENCH POLICE MANAGED EVENTUALLY TO NEGOTIATE THE SURRENDER OF THE PALESTINIANS. AS THE LATTER WERE BEING LED OUT OF THE EMBASSY, IRAQI SECURITY AGENTS OPENED FIRE, APPARENTLY AIMING AT THE PALESTINIANS. IN THE ENSUING SHOOT-OUT A FRENCH POLICE INSPECTOR WAS KILLED AND ANOTHER INJURED.

2. THE IRAQI EMBASSY EMPLOYEES WERE EXPELLED FROM FRANCE A DAY OR TWO LATER. THEY WERE NOT BROUGHT TO TRIAL AND NO OTHER ACTION WAS TAKEN AGAINST THE IRAQI EMBASSY, DESPITE PUBLIC CLAMOUR FOR STRONGER ACTION.

3. YOU MIGHT ALSO WISH TO BEAR IN MIND THE ARREST BY THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES IN OCTOBER 1983 OF SAID RASHID, A LIBYAN WANTED BY THE ITALIANS IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCIDENT AT MILAN RAILWAY STATION IN 1980. RASHID WAS SIMPLY RELEASED AFTER THE LIBYANS PREVENTED FOR A WHILE FRENCH CITIZENS FROM LEAVING LIBYA AND AFTER THE ITALIANS (AT FRENCH REQUEST?) REFRAINED FROM SEEKING RASHID'S EXTRADITION (MY TELNO 928).

FRETWELL

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Prime Minister

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FM MOSCOW 241532Z APR 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 522 OF 24 APR
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON:
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, ROME

MIPT : MY CALL ON SOVIET FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER :

LIBYA

1. DRAWING ON YOUR TEL GUIDANCE NO 41, I RAISED WITH KORNIENKO THE SHOOTING INCIDENT OUTSIDE THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU ON 17 APRIL AND EXPLAINED WHY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO SEVER RELATIONS WITH LIBYA (WE HAD ALREADY INFORMED THE MINISTRY OF THIS DECISION THE PREVIOUS DAY).

2. IN PARTICULAR I DREW KORNIENKO'S ATTENTION TO

(I) THE LIBYAN REJECTION OF OUR PROPOSALS AND THE INADEQUACY OF QADHAFFI'S RESPONSE:

(II) OUR INTENTION TO CONTINUE SCRUPULOUSLY TO OBSERVE THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS:

(III) OUR REJECTION OF THE VARIOUS LIBYAN ALLEGATIONS ABOUT THE INCIDENT:

(IV) THE BACKGROUND OF REPEATED ACTS OF VIOLENCE INVOLVING LIBYANS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

3. I THEN TURNED TO THE HANDLING OF THE OUTRAGE BY THE SOVIET MEDIA, SAYING THAT IT WAS A MATTER FOR PROFOUND REGRET THAT THEIR ACCOUNTS HAD BEEN DISTORTED AND ONE-SIDED. IN PARTICULAR, I WISHED TO PROTEST AT AN ARTICLE APPEARING IN PRAVDA OF 24 APRIL WHICH DESCRIBED THE OUTRAGE AS A PRE-MEDITATED PROVOCATION

details attached

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ARTICLE WHICH DESCRIBED THE OUTRAGE AS A PRE-MEDITATED PROVOCATION BY LONDON. I WOULD REPORT THE ARTICLE TO MY AUTHORITIES. THEY WOULD BE DISMAYED AND SADDENED THAT THE ORGAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION COULD PERMIT SUCH IRRESPONSIBLE REPORTING ON ITS PAGES.

4. KORNIENKO, WHO WAS NOT COMFORTABLE IN HIS REPLY, ASKED WHAT THE LOGIC OF THE LIBYAN REACTION COULD HAVE BEEN IF THE DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE THE PEOPLE'S BUREAU HAD BEEN PEACEFUL. THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTED THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION AND WAS RESOLUTELY OPPOSED TO VIOLENCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES NATURALLY NEEDED TO HAVE ALL THE FACTS AND NOT JUST THOSE FROM ONE SIDE. BUT IN ANY CASE IT WAS NOT THEIR ROLE TO ACT AS JUDGE IN THE MATTER. AS TO PRAVDA, WE SHOULD NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS REPRESENTED THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. THE APPEARANCE OF THE ARTICLE IN PRAVDA DID NOT MEAN THAT IT HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. KORNIENKO HAD NOT HIMSELF READ IT AND COULD NOT THEREFORE PASS JUDGEMENT ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

5. I SAID THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT WAS PUBLISHED IN ITS MAIN NEWSPAPER. BOLSHAKOV'S PIECE WAS WILDLY OFF THE MARK. IT WOULD HAVE VERY UNFORTUNATE REPERCUSSIONS IN LONDON. SO FAR AS THE INCIDENT ITSELF WAS CONCERNED, THERE WAS NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT THE SHOOTING HAD COME FROM WITHIN THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU AND THAT IT HAD BEEN WHOLLY UNPROVOKED.

6. SINCE WE HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED ONE PRESS ENQUIRY ASKING WHETHER I INTENDED TO MAKE A PROTEST ABOUT THE PRAVDA PIECE, WE ARE INFORMING BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS OF THE GIST OF MY EXCHANGE WITH KORNIENKO.

7. SINCE DICTATING THE ABOVE, I HAVE SEEN YOUR TEL NO 367 WHICH ARRIVED AFTER I HAD LEFT FOR THE MINISTRY. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONSIDER THAT WHAT I SAID TO KORNIENKO (I LEFT BEHIND MY SPEAKING NOTE) ADEQUATELY COVERS THE POINT.

SUTHERLAND

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FM MOSCOW 241552Z APR 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 525 OF 24 APR
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON:
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO

MY TEL NO 521 : LIBYAN EMBASSY SHOOTING INCIDENT

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS OF THE PRAVDA ARTICLE REFERRED TO IN MY TUR:

(I) DURING A DEMONSTRATION BY OPPONENTS OF THE LIBYAN REGIME, GUNFIRE UNEXPECTEDLY STARTED ''IN FRONT OF'' THE EMBASSY BUILDING. THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES BLAMED THE INCIDENT ON THE STAFF OF THE LIBYAN EMBASSY AND STAGED A SIEGE.

(II) IN VIOLATION OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES SOUGHT PERMISSION TO SEARCH THE EMBASSY AND INTERROGATE ITS PERSONNEL.

(III) DESPITE LIBYA'S OFFICIAL DENIAL THAT ITS EMBASSY STAFF WERE INVOLVED, AND ITS EFFORTS, SUPPORTED BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, TO RESOLVE THE MATTER DIPLOMATICALLY, THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES CONTINUED ''TO STICK TO THEIR ASSERTION''.

(IV) ''ALL THIS, AS IT NOW TRANSPIRES, FITS FULLY INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF A SCENARIO WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE FOR A

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ASSERTION''.

(IV) ''ALL THIS, AS IT NOW TRANSPIRES, FITS FULLY INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF A SCENARIO WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE FOR A LARGE-SCALE PROVOCATION, THE AUTHORS OF WHICH SHOULD BE SOUGHT NOT ONLY IN LONDON. THE PROVOCATION OBVIOUSLY COINCIDED WITH THE STEPPING UP OF THE ANTI-LIBYAN CAMPAIGN IN THE USA''.

(V) WASHINGTON GAVE LONDON A TRANSPARENT HINT HOW TO ACT, CIRCULATING A REPORT THAT THE US HAD INTERCEPTED A MESSAGE FROM TRIPOLI TO LONDON IN WHICH THE STAFF OF THE EMBASSY WERE ALLEGEDLY ORDERED TO FIRE AT THE DEMONSTRATORS. THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES' DECISION TO BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH LIBYA FOLLOWED LITERALLY THE DAY AFTER THIS REPORT.

SUTHERLAND

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25 APR 1984

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FM WASHINGTON 250025Z APR 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1276 OF 24 APRIL

TELECON LONG(NENAD)/GOULTY : US/LIBYA

1. THE DEPARTMENT ASKED WHETHER THE CLOSURE OF THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU IN WASHINGTON IN MAY 1981 GAVE RISE TO PARTICULAR PROBLEMS WHICH MIGHT BE REPEATED IN LONDON OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT THE CLOSURE TOOK PLACE SMOOTHLY, DUE PARTLY TO THE PROFESSIONALISM OF THE LIBYAN CHARGE, ALI EL HOUDERI. THE LIBYANS GAVE A NUMBER OF PARTIES AND MEDIA INTERVIEWS IN WHICH THEY DENOUNCED THE U S ACTION BUT MADE NO DIFFICULTIES OVER THEIR ACTUAL DEPARTURE.

3. THE AMERICANS GAVE THEM FIVE WORKING DAYS IN WHICH TO LEAVE AND REQUIRED THEM TO DO SO FROM DULLES AIRPORT WITH DEPARTURE PLANS SUBMITTED 24 HOURS IN ADVANCE. THE LIBYANS COMPLIED ALTHOUGH THEY DELAYED THEIR DEPARTURE UNTIL ALMOST THE LAST MINUTE. THE AMERICANS TOOK PRECAUTIONS AT THE AIRPORT TO SEGREGATE THE LIBYANS, TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION WITH DEMONSTRATORS.

4. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SUGGEST THAT ANY FURTHER DETAILS WE NEED MIGHT BEST BE SOUGHT FROM THE LIBYA DESK OFFICER AT THE TIME, ALAN ROY, WHO IS NOW SERVING IN DUBLIN.

WRIGHT

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Prime Minister

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IN MPSB FOR CH SUPT B SQUAD FROM F5/1
IN COBR FOR MR R BARKER
IN FCO FOR PUSD
IN REGENCY FOR MR GLYNNE JONES
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT MEDIA REPORTS OF RENEWED LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR THE PROVISIONAL IRA (PIRA)
YOUR TEL 92/84 OF 24 APRIL 1984.

1. IN 1973 A CONSIGNMENT OF ARMS WAS INTERCEPTED EN ROUTE FROM LIBYA TO IRELAND SEMI COLON THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT SPONSORED THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND WAS INVOLVED IN ARRANGING ITS TRANSPORT.

2. AT THE TIME OF THE ST JAMES' SQUARE SHOOTING LIBYA'S OFFICIAL POLICY WAS TO DENY ANY MATERIAL AID TO THE PROVISIONAL IRA (PIRA) THOUGH TO SUPPORT ITS CAUSE. HOWEVER, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THE LIBYANS HAVE THREATENED TO RESUME MATERIAL AID TO PIRA UNLESS BRITAIN CEASES TO HARBOUR LIBYAN DISSIDENTS. AS RECENTLY AS 16 APRIL A SENIOR LIBYAN GOVERNMENT CONTACT TOLD THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR THAT PIRA WERE KEEN TO ESTABLISH AN OFFICE IN TRIPOLI AND THAT THE PROTECTION GIVEN TO THE QUOTE OPPOSITION UNQUOTE IN BRITAIN MADE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO PREVENT THIS. WE HAVE NO INTELLIGENCE ABOUT PIRA OR SINN FEIN APPROACHES TO OPEN AN OFFICE IN LIBYA.

3. NEVERTHELESS, OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS LEADING MEMBERS OF PIRA, /SUCH .....

SUCH AS PADDY RYAN AND JOE CAHILL, HAVE VISITED LIBYA AND THERE IS RECENT INTELLIGENCE TO SUGGEST THAT AN ELEMENT IN THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT MAY BE CONSIDERING SUPPLYING WEAPONS TO PIRA (BOX 500 REPORT 19/83 OF 26 OCTOBER 1983).

4. AN IRISH LIBYAN FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY (ILFS) CAME TO NOTICE IN TRIPOLI DURING THE 1981 HUNGER STRIKE: IT WAS REPORTED TO BE MORIBUND IN MARCH 1984. THE ILFS IS NOT KNOWN TO COMMAND ANY SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT IN IRELAND.

5. THE OFFICIALLY INSPIRED LIBYAN REPORTS OF AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE PEOPLES COMMITTEES AND THE IRA CAN BE SEEN AS AN INTENSIFICATION OF LIBYAN QUOTE POLITICAL UNQUOTE THREATS TO HMG OVER ITS REFUSAL TO ACT AGAINST LIBYAN DISSIDENTS. CLANDESTINE CONTACTS ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE AND THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT MAY NOW BE MORE PREPARED TO PROVIDE MONEY AND ARMS TO IRISH REPUBLICAN TERRORISTS, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT PIRA AT THIS STAGE WILL RECEIVE SUPPORT DURING TERRORIST ATTACKS. SUBJECT TO YOUR OWN ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT IN GREAT BRITAIN, WE DOUBT WHETHER PIRA WOULD SEE ANY MILITARY OR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE IN MOUNTING TERRORIST ATTACKS WHICH APPEAR TO SUPPORT THE LIBYAN CAUSE.

6. WE SHALL SHORTLY BE REVIEWING THE LONGER TERM IMPLICATIONS OF LIBYAN STATEMENTS ABOUT SUPPORT FOR PIRA.
GRS 360
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FROM OSLO 240930Z APR 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 85 OF 24 APRIL 1984
INFO PRIORITY COPENHAGEN, STOCKHOLM, HELSINKI
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEWYORK

YOUR GUIDANCE TELNO 42: LIBYA

1. IN A PRESS INTERVIEW ON 24 APRIL, THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT, AS FAR AS HE COULD JUDGE WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN LONDON, THAT LIBYA HAD BROKEN THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. HE THEREFORE REGARDED AS REASONABLE THE BRITISH DECISION TO CLOSE THE LIBYAN EMBASSY. STRAY WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS TRAGIC THAT A POLICE WOMAN WHO HAD BEEN GIVEN THE TASK OF PROTECTING THE EMBASSY SHOULD BE KILLED.

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BEEN GIVEN THE TASK OF PROTECTING THE EMBASSY SHOULD BE KILLED. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY DID NOT MEAN THAT ONE COULD DO WHATEVER ONE WANTED. IF THE HEAD OF MISSION WAS UNWILLING TO GIVE UP WHOEVER HAD FIRED THE SHOT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE BRITISH TO DISCOVER WHETHER THE PERSON CONCERNED HAD DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY OR NOT. THE LIBYANS HAD THUS BROKEN THEIR OBLIGATIONS.

2. WHEN I CALLED ON THE NORWEGIAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR TODAY, HE ADDED, WITH REFERENCE TO MR STRAY'S COMMENTS, THAT THE LIBYANS HAD WANTED THE NORWEGIANS (WHOSE AMBASSADOR IN ATHENS IS ACCREDITED IN TRIPOLI) TO OPEN A RESIDENT MISSION IN TRIPOLI. THE SHOOTING IN LONDON HAD FINALLY DECIDED THEM AGAINST THIS AND, IN RELAYING THEIR DECISION TO THE LIBYANS, THEY WOULD CITE WHAT HAD HAPPENED AS A REASON FOR NOT ACCEDING TO THE LIBYAN REQUEST.

3. RAVNE ASKED WHETHER WE WISHED THE NORWEGIANS TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION (THEY HAD NO PLANS FOR THIS AT PRESENT). I SAID THAT I WAS SURE YOU WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR MR STRAY'S CLEAR STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR OUR ACTION AND THAT I DID NOT FOR THE TIME BEING HAVE ANY INSTRUCTIONS TO ASK FOR ANYTHING MORE FROM THE NORWEGIANS.

LOGAN

NNNN

SENT AT 241030Z HSP

RECVD AT AS ABOVE JCG

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MR ADAMS
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FM ANKARA 240940Z APR 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 213 OF 24 APRIL
INFO PRIORITY TO TRIPOLI AND ROME

MIPT: LIBYA

1. I HAVE JUST BEEN TELEPHONED BY THE LOCAL CORRESPONDENT OF THE TIMES, RASIT GURDILEK, AND ASKED TO CONFIRM THE STORY WHICH IS CARRIED IN TODAY'S ''TERCUMAN'' (ONE OF THE LEADING DAILIES) TO THE EFFECT THAT BRITAIN HAD ASKED THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO HELP IN DEFUSING THE LIBYAN CRISIS. THE TERCUMAN PIECE GOES ON TO SAY THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THE BRITISH PROPOSAL AND MADE THE NECESSARY INITIATIVES IN LIBYA AND THAT TURKEY'S MEDIATION WAS ACCEPTED BY TRIPOLI. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ACCORDING TO GURDILEK, HAS THIS MORNING AT THEIR NEWS CONFERNECE CONFIRMED THE TERCUMAN STORY (WHICH MUST HAVE BEEN MFA INSPIRED IN THE FIRST PLACE) AND LEFT OPEN THE SUGGESTION AS TO WHETHER THE TURKISH MEDIATION EFFORTS WOULD CONTINUE. GURDILEK ASKED FOR DETAILS OF THE PRESENT POSITION, AND IN PARTICULAR WHETHER I COULD SAY IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE RUPTURE OF RELATIONS WITH LIBYA BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WE WOULD WISH THE TURKISH MEDIATION EFFORTS TO CONTINUE.

2. I TOLD BURDILEK THAT THE STORY WAS BROADLY CORRECT. WE HAD INDEED ASKED TURKEY ALONG WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS WITH GOOD RELATIONS WITH LIBYA TO SEE IF THEY COULD ASSIST. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD AGREED TO OUR REQUEST AND HAD ACTED IN A MOST HELPFUL FASHION, BY INSTRUCTING THEIR AMBASSADOR IN TRIPOLI TO SPEAK TO THE LIBYAN AUTHORITIES. I COULD NOT SAY WHETHER WE SHOULD WISH THOSE EFFORTS TO CONTINUE. THAT QUESTION COULD ONLY BE ANSWERED BY NEWS DEPARTMENT. IN ANSWER TO GURDILEK'S QUESTION

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THE LIBYAN AUTHORITIES. I COULD NOT SAY WHETHER WE SHOULD WISH THOSE EFFORTS TO CONTINUE. THAT QUESTION COULD ONLY BE ANSWERED BY NEWS DEPARTMENT. IN ASNWER TO GURDILEKS'S QUESTION, I CONFIRMED THAT WE HAD ASKED FOR TURKISH GOVERNMENT HELP TOWARDS THE END OF LAST WEEK, I.E. BEFORE THE DECISION TO BREAK RELATIONS. AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE AND THE TURKISH NEWS AGENCY ANKA HAVE ALSO MADE SIMILAR ENQUIRIES TO THE CHANCERY. WE SHALL STICK TO THE LINE ABOVE PENDING ANY FURTHER GUIDANCE FROM YOU.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 281 OF 24 APRIL 1984
INFO PRIORITY TO JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK

MYTEL NO.280: LIBYA

1. I SPOKE TO FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN LAST NIGHT. HE SAID THAT THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT WOULD DO EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO HELP US. THEY WERE PREPARED TO SPEAK IN FRIENDLY BUT FIRM TERMS TO THE LIBYANS. HE WAS HIMSELF DUE TO GO TO LIBYA ON ABOUT 3 MAY FOR A PAKISTAN-LIBYA JOINT COMMISSION MEETING. HE HAD NOT WANTED TO GO, BUT THE LIBYANS HAD BEEN EMBARRASSINGLY PRESSING. IF THE PROBLEM WAS STILL PERSISTING BY THEN HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO TAKE IT UP WITH THE LIBYANS. I SAID THAT THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WAS TO EXTRICATE OUR EMBASSY SAFELY AND TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN LIBYA. HE SAID THAT THEIR AMBASSADOR IN TRIPOLI ''HAD BEEN ALERTED''.

2. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT SEE WHAT ELSE WE COULD HAVE DONE. THIS SENTIMENT WAS ECHOED BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE CABINET AND CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH WHOM I SPOKE YESTERDAY. ALL SUPPORT THE ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN (ONE MINISTER MAKING THE POINT THAT WE SHOULD REMAIN FRIENDLY

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2. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT SEE WHAT ELSE WE COULD HAVE DONE. THIS SENTIMENT WAS ECHOED BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE CABINET AND CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH WHOM I SPOKE YESTERDAY. ALL SUPPORT THE ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN (ONE MINISTER MAKING THE POINT THAT WE SHOULD REMAIN FRIENDLY BUT FIRM AND AVOID PUSHING GADDAFI TO EXTREMES) AND THERE WAS NO DISPOSITION TO BELIEVE THE LIBYAN SIDE OF THE STORY WHICH HAS BEEN WIDELY CIRCULATED BY THE LIBYAN ''EMBAUSY'' HERE.

3. THE OCCASION FOR THESE TALKS WAS A SMALL RECEPTION FOR CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH OF SAUDI ARABI. HE ASKED ME FOR THE LATEST POSITION ON THE LIBYAN CRISIS (HE HAD BEEN AWAY IN PESHAWAR ALL DAY) AND I TOLD HIM IN DETAIL ABOUT THE BREACH OF RELATIONS AND THE TIME LIMITS FOR WITHDRAWAL. I STRESSED THE NEED FOR ENSURING THE SAFETY OF OUR EMBASSY AND CITIZENS IN LIBYA AND SAID THAT I KNEW WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING SAUDI ARABIA COULD DO TO HELP. HE REPLIED DIPLOMATICALLY THAT HE HAD THE GREATEST RESPECT FOR AND CONFIDENCE IN MRS THATCHER AND THAT HE WAS SURE SHE WOULD FIND A WAY OF RESOLVING THE PROBLEM TO OUR SATISFACTION.

4. I SPOKE BRIEFLY THIS MORNING TO NIAZ NAIK, FOREIGN SECRETARY. HE SAID THAT A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ZIA TO MRS THATCHER WAS BEING FINALISED. HE DID NOT REVEAL WHAT WAS IN IT BEYOND SAYING THAT HE ASSUMED THAT PRIME MINISTER'S ORIGINAL MESSAGE (YOUR TEL NO.50 TO RABAT) WAS OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS, BUT THAT THEY WOULD BE SENDING INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR EMBASSY IN TRIPOLI.

5. IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE PAKISTANIS WANT TO BE HELPFUL, BUT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW FAR THEY WILL GO IN PUBLIC, AS OPPOSED TO PRIVATE, SUPPORT FOR US. AS I SAID IN MY TUR, THEIR RELATIONS WITH LIBYA ARE UNEASY AND THEY HAVE HAD SPORADIC TROUBLE OVER THEIR OWN COMMUNITY IN LIBYA.

FORSTER

NNNN

Thanks A.A.

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13

ANGLO/LIBYAN CRISIS: SITUATION REPORT AT AT 1900 HOURS 24 APRIL 1984

ACTION AGAINST LIBYANS

1. Baghdadi was deported today. Matuq was arrested. It is believed that there are now no non-diplomatic members of the revolutionary committee at liberty in the United Kingdom.

POLICE PLANS

2. Police plans for the exit from St James's Square (and other buildings) are now ready. The plans were discussed in detail with Fitouri and Zlitni at the FCO this morning. All details were settled, though they attempted to reserve their position pending the arrival of Shaibi. They were pressed to provide lists of those in the buildings, but continued to fail to do so. They were persuaded to accept in principle that those in the LPB should rendevous with families at Sunningdale, which would shield them from the press (and permit police questioning). Zlitni visited Sunningdale in the early afternoon, and was evidently impressed by the facilities. During the visit, he indicated that he hoped they could now leave soon. It remains possible that the arrival of Shaibi will slow progress. While at Sunningdale, Zlitni telephoned the Bureau and was informed that Shaibi would arrive at Gatwick at 6 pm. He accepted readily the suggestion that the negotiation group should meet briefly after Sir J Leahy's meeting with Shaibi later this evening. For the police, it was a quiet, hot day. The new cordon at Ennismore Gardens is now established and working, with negligible protests from the Libyans.

THE EMISSARY

3. Shaibi is accompanied by two others. Accommodation for his party has been arranged in co-operation with the Security Service.

THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU

4. During the afternoon within the LPB most of the Libyans appear to have been concerned with packing and making other arrangements for leaving, such as the acquisition of consumer goods. The mood seems to be quiet and sombre.

5. This morning Dr Sudani complained to Tripoli that he was not being kept informed about the arrangements being made for the Libyans to leave the LPB. He was instructed by Tripoli that no one was to leave the UK before Sunday.

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LIBYAN REACTIONS

6. There has still been no violent reaction in Libya to our decision to break relations. We have however heard, albeit at third hand, that Qadhafi has decided that if the police enter the peoples' bureau after the break in relations the British Embassy in Tripoli will be burnt down.

7. In his discussions with Foreign Liaison Bureau officials about the practical arrangements for the hand-over to the protecting power and departure of our Embassy staff our Ambassador is making painfully slow progress. The Libyans have orally agreed our proposal for an interests Section and (at 1900 hours) had nominated Saudi Arabia as their protecting power. However, we still have no confirmation that they accept Italy as our protecting power. The Libyans have somewhat relaxed restrictions on Embassy staff to allow visits to families by diplomats in the Chancery. But they have refused to allow members of the staff or their families to leave individually before the deadline on 29 April. Today the Consul's daughter and nanny were turned back at the airport. Mr Miles will try to use our decision to accept a 2-man interests section to secure a relaxation on the early departuer of staff and families. Further progress is unlikely until serious negotiations with Colonel Shaibi begin on 25 April. Meanwhile, we are giving urgent consideration to evacuation of our staff, possibly by chartering a British Caledonian aircraft.

8. We have no further news of the detained British Caledonian manager Ledingham. Mr Miles has tried to make use of the deportation today of one of the Revolutionary students (Baghdadi) and the detention today of a second (Matuq) as a lever to secure his release.

9. With the reopening of business in capitals after the Easter holiday we are receiving an increasing number of sympathetic responses to our successive approaches to other governments for support. Sir J Leahy gave a briefing to EC representatives this afternoon.

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ANGLO/LIBYAN CRISIS: SITUATION REPORT AS AT 2000 HOURS 23 APRIL 1984
(Report from the scene at Annex)

MEDIA REACTIONS TO MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS ON THE BREACH

1. Media reactions to the decision to break-off relations have favoured the decision to breach. Adverse comment has concentrated on -

a. The "Release of the murderer";

b. Why action was not taken earlier;

c. Whether the provision of the Vienna Convention can be considered satisfactory in the light of events at the Libyan People's Bureau.

2. Ministers will be considering the best approach to adopt on each of these topics in preparing the draft statement to the House (and question and answer brief) on Wednesday.

ACTION AGAINST LIBYANS

3. The police and security service have identified a number of Libyans whom it might be appropriate to deport on the grounds that their presence here is not conducive to the public good. The Home Secretary signed a deportation on one, Mabruk, this morning; Mabruk duly left on the 1510 hours flight to Libya this afternoon. A Libyan thought to be Baghdadi, against whom the Home Secretary has signed a notice of intention to deport, was arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions Act) at Heathrow Airport this afternoon. Police are trying to establish his identity for certain before involving the remainderof the deportation process.

REACTION AMONG THE LIBYANS IN THE PEOPLE'S BUREAU IN LONDON

4. There were two meetings between Fitouri and British officials today.

5. The impression given by the Libyans was that those in the LPB, the Consulate and student centre were prepared to move out by Sunday, and a number of practical matters were discussed, although the details remained to be settled. The idea of a move of personnel from the LPB to a "safe location" (Sunningdale) was mooted; Fitouri took note, but made clear that their preference was for a direct move from the LPB to the airport. He also said that some LPB staff

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might like to leave the United Kingdom in their private cars. News interviews over the telephone to the LPB by BBC and Independent Radio News had spokesmen for the Bureau saying that they would not leave before Sunday. Libyan radio reported that those in the LPB had been cabled by Tripoli to say that they were prepared to die in the process of defending their beliefs (there is no corroboration for this story from Security Service sources).

6. Secret sources indicated that the personel in the LPB were relieved at the prospect of departure, and were continuing to make preparations for it. No firm instructions have been received from Tripoli but intelligence supports public statements that their departure from the Bureau will be dealyed until Sunday.

LIBYA

7. Our decision to break relations appears to have surprised the Libyans and given us the initiative for a time. There has been no formal substantive reply to our decision to break relations, apparently because as Treiki has told us a decision on a break will be referred to the People's Congresses. But, in practical terms HM Ambassador's contacts with Treiki today and our dealings with the LPB here suggest that the Libyans may be ready to be reasonably co-operative over the departure of the LPB and our Embassy staff by the deadline. They are sending a senior figure, al Rahman Shaibi (of deputy Minister rank) to London to oversee the departure. He is expected to arrive tomorrow (probably on the Libyan arab airline flight arriving at 13.55 though this timing is not yet confirmed). But they clearly intend to apply their concept of reciprocity to the end and have imposed new restrictions on the movements of members of our Embassy in Tripoli. We have discussed with HMA Tripoli arrangements for evacuation of our staff and families. The Libyans may send a special aircraft. We are looking at the possibility of chartering an aircraft from British Caledonian to bring out staff and baggage.

8. We cannot be sure that Qaddafi will not follow up his tough words with action against our people in Libya. We can place little reliance on Treiki's assurance that the British community is welcome to remain in Libya. Treiki told HMA Tripoli again today that charges might be brought against the British Caledonian Station Manager, Ledingham, who has been detained since 19 April.

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9. Treiki's statement that our decision to break relations would be referred to the People's Congresses which alone had power decision on such questions was not reassuring. Some form of "rentacrowd" reaction can be expected, perhaps including further summary detentions. We have instructed a wide selection of posts to make urgent approaches to foreign governments to enlist their support and help in putting pressure on the Libyans to honour their international obligations. The Prime Minister's personal messages to Heads of State have elicited valuable expressions of sympathy and willingness to help. They have been followed up by the posts concerned, and if the going gets tougher it may be necessary to do so again. We shall be arranging a Community briefing on 24 April to mobilise support among the Ten. We have instructed our Embassy on Bonn to urge the Germans to hint to the Libyans that unless the Libyans co-operate with us Genscher may cancel his proposed visit to Libya on 30 April. The US has welcomed our decision to break relations, but as yet there has been little reaction from other countries, presumably because of the holiday period.

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ANNEX

Report from the Scene

There have been no significant developments at the Scene. Libyan Peoples Bureau contacts with negotiators confirm that they were unsettled by the decision to break off relations, but some of them evidently welcome the prospect of returning to Libya. Perhaps as a result of that, the first two meetings to negotiate exit arrangements have gone relatively easily and no major difficulties over such crucial points as freedom of movement and personal search procedures have emerged. The Libyans have been pressed to provide lists of the personnel in the various buildings involved. They confirmed their willingness to do so and stated that the families of those involved have already started packing. The Libyans also notified us of one or two compassionate cases, including for example a 12 year old girl, daughter of a memeber of staff who is undergoing treatment for leukaemia. They are providing full details of such cases, which we undertook to consider carefully.

Today's progress may be deceptive: we would expect it to be slowed or reversed by the intervention of the emisary from Tripoli who arrives tomorrow. But the next negotiating meeting on exit arrangements is at 10 am tomorrow and Fitouri and Zlitni appear to look forward to it quite happily.

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TELNO 223 OF 23/4/83
INFO SEOUL (FOR S OF S PARTY) , ROME, ACCRA, KUWAIT.

MY TELNO 221: ANGLO-LIBYAN RELATIONS.

1. I SAW TRAIKI AGAIN WITH JERBI AT 1230 LOCAL. MUHANNA HAD ALREADY SEEN HIM AND BRIEFED ME IN ADVANCE, SO I DID NOT TRY TO INSIST THAT HE AND ASMAH SHOULD BE PRESENT. I HAVE BRIEFED THEM SINCE.

POLITICAL

2. TRAIKI BEHAN AND FINISHED WITH SOME WARM REMARKS ABOUT ME, AND ABOUT HIS HOPE THAT A MINIMUM OF ANGLO-LIBYAN GOOD-WILL WOULD SURVIVE, QUOTING AS A HOPEFUL SIGN OUR PHRASE THAT THE BREACH IS '' FOR THE TIME BEING'' (YOUR TELNO 176, PARA 2). HE SAID BRITISH PEOPLE WOULD ENJOY ALL FACILITIES HERE. HE WARNED ON FAMILIAR LINES OF THE DANGER OF ALLOWING HOSTILE LIBYAN ELEMENTS (WANTED BY INTERPOL) TO OPERATE AND SAID LIBYA HAD REFRAINED FROM BACKING THE IRA.

PROTECTING POWER

3. LIBYA WOULD WANT A PROTECTING POWER AND WOULD REPLY FORMALLY ON ITALY (HE IMPLIED NO PROBLEM). HE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE SMALL INTERESTS SECTIONS, ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY,DETAILS TO BE AGREED (INCLUDING NAMES, FLAGS ETC).

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ADMIN

4. THEY WISHED TO SEND ABD. AL-RAHMAN SHAIBI, PROBABLY ON 24 APRIL, TO SUPERVISE DEPARTURE. WE DO NOT KNOW HIM(" WISE AND EXPERIENCED" - TRAIKI). SHOULD WE ISSUE VISA OR WILL YOU MAKE SPECIAL RECEPTION ARRANGEMENTS?.

5. SEE MYTEL 224. FOR ADMIN POINTS. TRAIKI'S POSITION WAS SOLIDLY ON RECIPROCITY , WITH A LITTLE FLEXIBILITY ON POINTS OF PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE.

CONSULAR

5. I MENTIONED LEDINGHAM AGAIN: RESPONSE WAS THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY HEAR OF CHARGES SOON.

MILES

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TELNO 224 OF 23/4/84

OUR TELNO 223: ANGLO/LIBYAN RELATIONS.

1. AUTHORITIES HERE WILL ONLY FACILITATE DEPARTURE ON A STRICTLY RECIPROCAL BASIS. WE NEED TO BE ABLE TO TELL LIBYANS THAT THEIR PEOPLE IN LPB ARE BEING ALLOWED THE FOLLOWING, IF THEY WISH:-

A) PACKING FIRMS MAY ENTER ACCOMMODATION, BOTH OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE TO PACK AND THEN EXPORT EFFECTS:

B) THEY CAN SELL OR EXPORT THEIR PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL CARS:

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C) THEY CAN DEPART AT ANY TIME BEFORE THE DEADLINE, IN SMALL GROUPS IF THEY WISH. THEY MAY LEAVE BY AIR OR OVERLAND.

2. LIBYANS PROPOSE SENDING A SPECIAL PLANE TO UK TO FLY THEIR PEOPLE AND EFFECTS OUT - PROVIDED YOU AGREE. THEY HAVE OFFERED US A SIMILAR FACILITY. THIS TIES IN WITH TODAY'S TELE-CONFERENCE. GRATEFUL YOU PURSUE THIS WITH BCAL.

3. GRATEFUL FOR REPLY TODAY.

MILES

POLICE COL

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RESTRICTED
FM TRIPOLI 222040Z APR
TO FLASH FCO
TEL NO. 218 OF 22/4/84
AND TO FLASH ROME
SEOUL (FOR S OF S PARTY)

MY TEL NO. 216: LIBYAN CRISIS

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY AND A NUMBER OF STAFF HAVE BEEN REFUSED PERMISSION TO LEAVE EMBASSY BY PERSONS IN PLAIN CLOTHES TO WHOM THE POLICE DEFER. I TELEPHONED JERATI TO PROTEST AND WAS GIVEN THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE COMMITTEE (ROUGH TRANSLATION):

"IN APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY, UNTIL STEPS ARE COMPLETED FOR DEPARTURE, DIPLOMATIC STAFF IN THE EMBASSY ARE TO REMAIN IN IT AND DIPLOMATS IN THEIR HOUSES WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO BRING IN OR OUT ANYTHING EXCEPT FOOD AS IN THE CASE OF DIPLOMATS IN LONDON. THE AMBASSADOR MAY MOVE BETWEEN THE EMBASSY AND HIS RESIDENCE WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE POLICE AS IS THE CASE WITH OUR OFFICE IN LONDON. THESE STEPS MAY BE DISCUSSED ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCATY. TRAIKI WILL MEET THE AMBASSADOR TOMORROW TO INFORM HIM OF CERTAIN MATTERS AT A TIME TO BE FIXED. WE SHALL SEND A PERSON TO LONDON TO SUPERVISE DEPARTURE AND WILL INFORM YOU OF HIS ~~DATE~~ NAME AT THE MEETING"

2. I AM ATTEMPTING TO INFORM ASMAH AND MUHANNA. MY HOUSE IS FULL OF JOURNALISTS BUT I AM TOLD THEY WILL BE PERMITTED TO LEAVE.

3. NOMINAL ROLL OF THOSE DETAINED IS IN MIFT.

ASMAH + MUHANNA

MILES

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LIBYAN CRISIS

ADVANCE COPIES 252)

PS/Mr Luce
PS/Lady Young
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
~~MR WRIGHT~~
MR EGERTON
MR ADAMS
~~SIR J LEAHY~~
CHIEF CLERK
MR WHITE
Sir J Bullard
HD/NENAD
HD/MAED
HD/DEFENCE
HD/NUSD
HD/CONSULAR
HD/NEWS
HD/SECURITY
HD/PROTOCOL
PS/PCD
RESIDENT CLERK

HOME OFFICE
No.10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE BRIEFING ROOM
DS11 MOD
DS C, MOD
RESIDENT CLERK, MOD

MR FREELAND
MRS DENZA
} LEGAL ADVISERS

Prime Minister

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM ALGIERS 230920Z APR 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 76 OF 23 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, TRIPOLI

INFO ROUTINE RABAT

MY TELNO 75 (NOT TO ALL): LIBYA

1. ALGERIAN TUNE MAY BE UNDERGOING SOME CHANGE IN OUR FAVOUR. GHOUALMI RANG BACK THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 50 TO RABAT) HAD NOW BEEN SEEN BY PRESIDENT CHADLI. UNOFFICIALLY GHOUALMI WISHED TO TELL US THAT ALGERIANS COMPLETELY SHARED OUR VIEWS AND THAT IT WAS LIKELY A REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER WOULD BE SENT SOON SAYING THAT THE ALGERIANS WERE LOOKING AT WAYS OF CONTRIBUTING TO A SOLUTION.

2. YOUR TELS NOS GUIDANCE 42 AND 52 TO RABAT WERE RECEIVED HERE TOO LATE FOR ACTION TO BE TAKEN WITH MFA YESTERDAY EVENING. I HAVE ASKED TO SEE UNDER SECRETARY FOR WESTERN EUROPE, CHITTOUR, URGENTLY. GHOUALMI HAS UNDERTAKEN TO ARRANGE THIS.

3. COMMENT. THIS QUICK PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE IS ENCOURAGING, AND HAS MARKS OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERVENTION, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF UNHELPFUL INITIAL RESPONSE WE RECEIVED FROM MFA. BUT ALGERIANS MAY YET SEE THEIR SCOPE FOR INTERVENTION AS LIMITED, GIVEN THEIR PRIMARY INTEREST IN KEEPING THEIR UNEASY RELATIONS WITH QADAFFI ON EVEN KEEL, E.G. IN CONTEXT OF WEST SAHARAN DISPUTE, ALGERIA'S ROLE IN ENCOURAGING RECONCILIATION BETWEEN PLO FACTIONS, AND NOT LEAST THEIR OUTSTANDING BORDER PROBLEMS WITH LIBYA.

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LIBYANS: SITUATION REPORT AT 2200 HOURS, 22 APRIL 1984

THE MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS

1. The two Ministerial statements at the press conference held by the Home Secretary and Mr Luce were apparently well received. Most of the questioning concentrated on what would happen if the Libyans did not comply with the conditions we had made. Many of the questioners represented the US press. There was surprisingly little questioning about the possible effects on the British Community in Libya.

REACTIONS IN TRIPOLI

2. Mr Miles reported that his meeting with the Libyan Foreign Secretary equivalent, Dr Traiki, at 6.00 pm our time had been as friendly as could be expected. Traiki had expressed regret at our unilateral decision, "the consequences of which were for us to bear". However, he continued that Libya would not be the first to take any step against British interests; Britons were still welcome in Libya. Kuwaiti and Ghanaian diplomatic representatives have agreed to Mr Miles' request to act as observers of the legal proprieties of the Embassy's departure.

REACTION AMONG THE LIBYANS IN THE PEOPLE'S BUREAU IN LONDON

3. When we learned that Traiki had arranged a press conference at 6.00 pm, the same time as the appointment he had given to Mr Miles, we decided to bring forward our meeting in London with the Acting Secretary-General of the People's Bureau. Accordingly, Mr Egerton, AUS at the FCO, saw Fitouri for 20 minutes at 5.45 pm.to tell him of our decision and to hand over a formal note. Fitouri took the news calmly and sadly; it was clearly no surprise. Mr Egerton proposed a further meeting at 10.00 am tomorrow to discuss the modalities of departure for the Libyans. Fitouri undertook to report this proposal to Tripoli. Mr Egerton said that we expected the Libyans to facilitate the departure of our people in the same spirit.

4. When Fitouri returned to St James's Square from his meeting with Mr Egerton he told the police that he would like everyone out of the People's Bureau as soon as possible. He said that there could be discord inside but he could control it. Zlitni took the news of the breach of relations calmly and as a matter of course.

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5. The police negotiators report that throughout the day up to the announcement of the breach there had been a general air of depression in the Bureau. Immediately after the announcement there were expressions of relief and the mood appeared to lighten.

REACTION AMONG MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE IN LONDON

6. Secret and reliable sources report that among members of the Revolutionary Committee in London (who are not in the Libyan People's Bureau) and their Co-ordinator, Dr Omar Sudani, the initial reaction to the announcement appears to be one of surprise and consternation. On Sudani's instructions Tripoli was contacted with a request for advice; the reply was that Libyans in London should do nothing until further instructions were sent from Tripoli, and (later) that an announcement in Tripoli was to be expected. Sudani still appears to be trying to maintain his position within the Revolutionary Committee.

OTHER MATTERS

7. Before the announcement, a press conference was being arranged at the Libyan Commercial Office and Students Centre in Ennismore Gardens at 11.00 am on 23 April. Student activists with a good command of English were being summoned to meet the press. It is not yet known if the Conference will still be held.

8. The police are keeping a close watch on 62 Ennismore Gardens and will continue doing so until they implement their plan to cordon it off at 8.00 am on 23 April.

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Ian Trethowan p10 | By Karen Armstrong p18 | UNIVERSITY p7 | Belloc p14 | C(

Libya ordered: sho

SHOOT AT PC

Embassy building must be cleared, Brittan insists

By GEORGE JONES, NORMAN KIRKHAM and CHRISTOPHER HOUSE

INTERCEPTED messages between Tripoli and London show that the shooting of a policewoman outside the Libyan mission in St James's Square last week was carried out on the direct order of Colonel Gaddafi's government in Tripoli.

The Sunday Telegraph has learned that the orders to the Libyans in the "People's Bureau" in London were:

1. To open fire on any anti-Gaddafi demonstrators who gathered outside the building.
2. To shoot at the accompanying police officers; and
3. To follow up with an IRA-style campaign of bombing.

Although the orders were fully intercepted by Western agencies, they were not decoded and processed in time to reach the Home Office and police before the demonstration at which Policewoman Yvonne Fletcher was killed took place.

Negotiations over the expulsion of the occupants of the Libyan "People's Bureau" in London reached deadlock last night amid signs that Britain is running out of patience with Colonel Gaddafi.

Early this morning, however, Colonel Gaddafi was reported in Tripoli to have offered to send his own investigators to London to inquire into the shooting and, if they discovered a Libyan was responsible, he would have to be put on trial in Libya.

The Libyan leader repeated, however, his previous assertion that the shooting did not come from inside the "People's Bureau." He has already said British police shot WPc Fletcher.

The offer was being interpreted in London late last night as just another delaying tactic. It is unlikely that the British Government will take him at his word and the Foreign Office refused to comment.

Before Colonel Gaddafi's move, Mr Brittan, the Home Secretary, issued an ultimatum that the Libyans must leave the Embassy building; be interviewed by police; and allow the premises to be searched for weapons.

The killer of WPc Fletcher may well go free, however, as part of the expulsion plan, as Ministers doubt whether he can be prosecuted and convicted.

Expulsion of the Libyans is being described by some senior policemen as the "soft option."

They fear that allowing the killer to go free would jeopardise the whole credibility of the tough stance British police have taken against terrorism, particularly as London is increasingly a battleground for Middle East groups.

Deadly Secret of the Siege —P.19
Editorial Comment—P.18

There could also be a public backlash, but Ministers believe that, if they are to ensure the safety of Britons in Libya, they may have no alternative.

It was being emphasised that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find sufficient evidence with which to bring successful prosecution in a British court against any individual.

Five days have elapsed since the shooting, and ministers argue that it is unlikely that there are still fingerprints on the automatic weapon involved, or evidence such as powder traces behind fingernails.

There was anger and frustration among Ministers and officials in Whitehall last night after negotiations in Tripoli between Mr Oliver Miles, the British Ambassador, and Dr Treiki, Libyan Foreign Minister, made no progress.

The Ambassador repeated calls in Britain that diplomatic relations with Libya should be severed, and that the 30 or 40 Libyans under police siege in the St James's Square building should be expelled. The Libyan Minister blandly refused to discuss this and simply repeated that his Government wanted to resume normal relations—a demand unacceptable to Britain.

The Government's exasperation was made plain by Mr Brittan in an interview as he left the Cabinet Office, where the briefing rooms for Cobra, the top-level committee co-ordinating the response to the crisis, are located.

He said that the negotiations were going "painfully slowly" and that the siege must be resolved quickly as the situation had been made worse by the bomb attack at Heathrow on Friday in which 22 people were injured.

Despite Mr Brittan's public statement that a link between the explosion and the embassy siege had not yet been established conclusively, little or no doubt was expressed about this at the two-hour Cobra meeting.

Ministers were asking last night how many more bombings must be tolerated in London before the St James's Square crisis is settled.

The Home Secretary rejected any suggestion that the Government's determination was weakening. He said: "We are still firm in our resolve that the occupants should come out and be interviewed. We must be able to ensure that the building is cleared and be satisfied that it does not contain anything of danger to the public."

The Cobra committee will meet again this morning. Taking part in the talks will be Mr Brittan, Mr Richard Luce, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Sir Kenneth Newman, Metropolitan Police Commissioner, and top officials. Meanwhile Mr Miles has been ordered in Tripoli to seek further talks with the Libyan Foreign Ministry.

One of the proposals which will now be considered urgently by the Government is the question of mobilising international pressure on Libya. The dispute is likely to be taken to the United Nations; Britain will also seek help from other Arab countries.

The first priority of Britain is to get the Libyan diplomats and students out of the bureau and clear it of all weapons. This will probably mean that the killer will escape prosecution.

There is understood to be a cache of weapons and explosives on the premises, and police also believe there are at least two men wanted for questioning after last month's bombings in London and Manchester inside the "People's Bureau."

Two Libyan students, aged 19 and 24, who were arrested at Heathrow Airport an hour after the bomb went off on Friday night were released without being charged yesterday.

Sunday Telegraph
22 APRIL 1984.

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MR. LUCE'S STATEMENT

1. The murder of WPC Fletcher on 17 April from inside the Libyan People's Bureau was outrageous. It was a totally unacceptable and unprecedented breach of British law, international law and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. We immediately asked the Libyan authorities to instruct those inside the Bureau to leave the building and to allow it to be searched for weapons and explosives. This request has been repeatedly refused by the Libyans.

2. Faced with this Libyan refusal, we proposed to the Libyan authorities:

a that all current occupants of the People's Bureau and all other Libyan diplomatic staff in the UK should leave the country in safety;

b that our own diplomatic staff should leave Libya in safety; and

c that we should be satisfied that all weapons and explosives were removed from the Libyan People's Bureau and that their buildings in the UK were no longer capable of being used as a base for terrorist acts.

In this context diplomatic relations would be terminated by agreement.

3. The Libyans have not accepted these proposals. Instead, they in effect suggested that the outrage of 17 April should simply be put on one side. Colonel Qadhaffi's proposal for a Libyan Commission of Inquiry is, of course, his affair, but we believe it is a wholly inadequate response to this flagrant abuse of diplomatic immunity.

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4. The British Government have therefore decided to break relations forthwith with Libya. We have informed the Acting Secretary General of the People's Bureau here. The British Ambassador at Tripoli, Mr. Oliver Miles, has instructions to inform the Libyan authorities this evening.

5. For our part, we shall continue scrupulously to observe our obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In accordance with accepted practice, we have given the staff of the Libyan People's Bureau and anyone else currently in the Libyan People's Bureau in St. James Square until midnight on 29/30 April to vacate their premises and leave the country. We shall make arrangements for their safe passage out of the country.

6. We have told the Libyans that the staff of the British Embassy will be withdrawn from Tripoli by midnight on Sunday 29 April. We have reminded the Libyan authorities of their obligation to guarantee their safe departure.

7. The safety of the British community in Libya has been the central priority throughout. We have made clear to the Libyan authorities that we hold them responsible for the safety of our people.

8. We are not at present advising the British community to leave Libya. British residents should consider their position carefully and keep in close touch with developments through the BBC World Service.

9. We shall exercise our right to designate a protecting power to look after the British community in Libya and will give that power every assistance.

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LIBYA: STATEMENT BY MINISTER OF STATE, 22 APRIL

1. The murder of WPC Fletcher on 17 April from inside the Libyan People's Bureau was outrageous. It was a totally unacceptable and unprecedented breach of British law, international law and the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations. We immediately asked the Libyan authorities to instruct those inside the Bureau to leave the building and to allow it to be searched for weapons and explosives. This request has been repeatedly refused by the Libyans.

2. Faced with this Libyan refusal, we proposed to the Libyan authorities:

(a) that all current accreditations of the people's Bureau and all other Libyan diplomatic staff in the UK should leave the country;

(b) that our own diplomatic staff should leave Libya in safety; and

(c) that we should be satisfied that all weapons and explosives were removed from the Libyan People's Bureau, and that the buildings in the UK were no longer capable of being used as a base for terrorist acts.

In this context diplomatic relations would be terminated by agreement.

3. The Libyans have not accepted these proposals. Instead, they in effect suggested that the outrage of 17 April should simply be put on one side. Colonel Gaddafi's proposal for a Libyan

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5 For our part, we shall continue scrupulously to observe our obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. ~~In accordance with accepted practice~~ we have given the staff of the Libyan People's Bureau and other diplomatic premises in London seven days to vacate their premises and leave the country. We shall make arrangements for their safe passage out of the country.

6 We have told the Libyans that the staff of the British Embassy with the -30 will withdraw from Tripoli by midnight on Sunday 29 April. We have reminded the Libyan authorities of their obligation to guarantee their safe departure.

7 The safety of the British community in Libya has been an essential priority throughout. We have made clear to the Libyan authorities that we hold them responsible for the safety of our people. ~~and we have instructed Mr Miles to seek reassurances on this point.~~

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8. We are not at present advising the British community to leave Libya. British businessmen should consider their position carefully and keep in close touch with developments through the BBC World Service.

9. The interests of the British community in Libya will be looked after by the protecting power. It is our intention that British consular officials should help in this task. I have no doubt that the willingness of British citizens to continue working in Libya will be determined by the Libyan authorities.

We shall exercise our right to designate a protecting power to look after the Brit community in Libya – and will give that power every assistance

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LIBYA : STATEMENT BY MR RICHARD LUCE MP,
MINISTER OF STATE AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
22 APRIL 1984

1. The murder of WPC Fletcher on 17 April from inside the Libyan People's Bureau was outrageous. It was a totally unacceptable and unprecedented breach of British law, international law and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. We immediately asked the Libyan authorities to instruct those inside the Bureau to leave the building and to allow it to be searched for weapons and explosives. This request has been repeatedly refused by the Libyans.

2. Faced with this Libyan refusal, we proposed to the Libyan authorities:

(a) that all current occupants of the People's Bureau and all other Libyan diplomatic staff in the UK should leave the country in safety;

(b) that our own diplomatic staff should leave Libya in safety; and

(c) that we should be satisfied that all weapons and explosives were removed from the Libyan People's Bureau, and that their buildings in the UK were no longer capable of being used as a base for terrorist acts.

In this context diplomatic relations would be terminated by agreement.

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4. The British Government have therefore decided to break relations forthwith with Libya. We have so informed the Acting Secretary-General of the People's Bureau here. The British Ambassador at Tripoli, Mr Oliver Miles, has instructions to inform the Libyan authorities this evening.

5. For our part, we shall continue scrupulously to observe our obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. We have given all Libyan diplomatic staff in London and anyone else currently in the Libyan People's Bureau in St James's Square until midnight on 29/30 April to vacate their premises and leave the country. We shall make arrangements for their safe passage out of the country.

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8. We are not at present advising the British community to leave Libya. British residents should consider their position carefully and keep in close touch with developments through the BBC World Service.

9. We shall exercise our right to designate a protecting power and will give that power all possible help.

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MR. LUCE'S STATEMENT

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In this context diplomatic relations would be terminated by agreement

3. The Libyans have not accepted these proposals. Instead, they in effect suggested that the outrage of 17 April should simply be put on one side. Colonel Qadhaffi's proposal for a Libyan Commission of Inquiry is, of course, his affair, but we believe it is a wholly inadequate response to this flagrant abuse of diplomatic immunity.

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6. We have told the Libyans that the staff of the British Embassy will be withdrawn from Tripoli by midnight on Sunday 29 April. We have reminded the Libyan authorities of their obligation to guarantee their safe departure.

7. The safety of the British community in Libya has been the central priority throughout. We have made clear to the Libyan authorities that we hold them responsible for the safety of our people.

8. We are not at present advising the British community to leave Libya. British residents should consider their position carefully and keep in close touch with developments through the BBC World Service.

9. We shall exercise our right to designate a protecting power to look after the British community in Libya and will give that power every assistance.

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LIBYA

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, MR RICHARD LUCE MP

22 APRIL 1984

1. The murder of WPC Fletcher on 17 April from inside the Libyan People's Bureau was outrageous. It was a totally unacceptable and unprecedented breach of British law, international law and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. We immediately asked the Libyan authorities to instruct those inside the Bureau to leave the building and to allow it to be searched for weapons and explosives. This request has been repeatedly refused by the Libyans.

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Commission of Enquiry is of course his affair, but we believe it is a wholly inadequate response to this flagrant abuse of diplomatic immunity.

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5. For our part, we shall continue scrupulously to observe our obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In accordance with accepted practice we have given the staff of the Libyan People s Bureau and other diplomatic premises in London seven days to vacate their premises and leave the country. We shall make arrangements for their safe passage out of the country.

We have given Libyan Diplomatic staff in London

6. We have told the Libyans that the staff of the British Embassy will be withdrawn from Tripoli by midnight on Sunday 29 April. We have reminded the Libyan authorities of their obligation to guarantee their safe departure.

7. The safety of the British community in Libya has been an essential priority throughout. We have made clear to the Libyan authorities that we hold them responsible for the safety of our people and we have instructed Mr Miles to seek reassurance on this point.

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8. We are not at present advising the British community to leave Libya. British residents should consider their position carefully and keep in close touch with developments through the BBC World Service.

9. The interests of the British community in Libya will be looked after by the protecting power. It is our intention that British consular officials should help in this task. I have no doubt that the willingness of British citizens to continue working in Libya will be determined by the Libyan response.

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LIBYA: STATEMENT BY MINISTER OF STATE, 22 APRIL

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In this context diplomatic relations would have be terminated by agreement.

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/8.

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8. We are not at present advising the British community to leave Libya. British residents should consider their position carefully and keep in close touch with developments through the BBC World Service.

9. The interests of the British community in Libya will be looked after by the protecting power. It is our intention that British consular officials should help in this task. I have no doubt that the willingness of British citizens to continue working in Libya will be determined by the Libyan response.

We shall exercise our right

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LIBYA: STATEMENT BY MINISTER OF STATE, 22 APRIL

1. The murder of WPC Fletcher on 17 April from inside the Libyan People's Bureau was outrageous. It was a totally unacceptable and unprecedented breach of British law, international law and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. We immediately asked the Libyan authorities to instruct those inside the Bureau to leave the building and to allow it to be searched for weapons and explosives. This request has been repeatedly refused by the Libyans.

2. Faced with this Libyan refusal, we proposed to the Libyan authorities:

(a) that all current occupants of the people's Bureau and all other Libyan diplomatic staff in the UK should leave the country;

(b) that our own diplomatic staff should leave Libya in safety; and

(c) that we should be satisfied that all weapons and explosives were removed from the Libyan People's Bureau, and that their buildings in the UK were no longer capable of being used as a base for terrorist acts.

In this context diplomatic relations would be terminated by agreement.

3. The Libyans have not accepted these proposals. Instead, they in effect suggested that the outrage of 17 April should simply be put on one side. Colonel Gadhafi's proposal for a Libyan

/Commission

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Commission of Enquiry is of course his affair, but we believe it is a wholly inadequate response to this flagrant abuse of diplomatic immunity.

4. The British Government have therefore decided to break relations forthwith with Libya. We have informed the Acting Secretary-General of the People s Bureau here. The British Ambassador at Tripoli, Mr Oliver Miles, has instructions to inform the Libyan authorities this evening.

5. For our part, we shall continue scrupulously to observe our obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. ~~In accordance with accepted practice we have given the staff of the Libyan People s Bureau and other diplomatic premises in London seven days to vacate their~~ premises and leave the country. We shall make arrangements for their safe passage out of the country.

We have given all Libyan diplomatic staff and anyone else ~~now in St James Square~~ in the Libyan People's Bureau in St James's Square until ...

6. We have told the Libyans that the staff of the British Embassy will be withdrawn from Tripoli by midnight on Sunday 29/30 April. We have reminded the Libyan authorities of their obligation to guarantee their safe departure.

7. The safety of the British community in Libya has been an essential priority throughout. We have made clear to the Libyan authorities that we hold them responsible for the safety of our people. ~~and we have instructed Mr Miles to seek reassurance on this point~~.

/8.

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8. We are not at present advising the British community to leave Libya. British residents should consider their position carefully and keep in close touch with developments through the BBC World Service.

9. ~~The interests of the British community in Libya will be looked after by the protecting power. It is our intention that British consular officials should help in this task.~~ I have no doubt that the willingness of British citizens to continue working in Libya will be determined by the Libyan response.

Libyans have to agree

We shall exercise our right to ~~appoint~~ designate a protecting power and will give that power every assistance.

to look after the British Community in Libya

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Press Conference at 6pm

LIBYA: DRAFT OUTLINE STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF STATE ON BREAKING RELATIONS

1. The murder of WPC Fletcher on 17 April from inside the Libyan People's Bureau was outrageous and unprecedented. It was a totally unacceptable breach of British law, international law and the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations. Since 17 April we have been trying to negotiate with the Libyan authorities a peaceful solution based on 3 points:

(a) that all current occupants of the People's Bureau and all other Libyan diplomatic staff in the UK should leave the country;

(b) that our own diplomatic and administrative staff should leave Libya in safety; and

(c) that we should be satisfied that all weapons and explosives have been removed from the Libyan People's Bureau, and that their buildings in the UK will no longer be capable of being used as a base for terrorist acts.

2. The Libyans do not accept these proposals. Instead they in effect suggested that the outrage of 17 April should simply be put on one side. Colonel Quadhifi's proposal for a Libyan Commission of Enquiry in Libya is unacceptable because the incidents of 17 April were within British jurisdiction.

3. The British Government have therefore decided unilaterally to break relations forthwith with Libya. The British Ambassador at Tripoli, Mr Oliver Miles, has so informed the Libyan authorities this afternoon. We have also informed the acting Secretary General of the People's Bureau here.

/4.

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4. We shall continue scrupulously to observe our obligations under the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations. In accordance with accepted practice we have given the staff of the Libyan People's Bureau in London seven days to vacate all their premises and the houses and leave the country. We shall make arrangements for their safe passage out of the country.

5. We have told the Libyans that the staff of the British Embassy will be withdrawn from Tripoli by midnight on Sunday 29 April. We expect the Libyan authorities to guarantee the safe departure of the British Ambassador and his staff and have told them so.

6. The safety of the British community in Libya is an essential priority. We have made clear to the Libyan authorities that we hold them responsible for the safety of the British community. The willingness of British citizens to continue working in Libya will be determined by the Libyan response.

7. We intend that the interests of the British community in Libya will be looked after by British Consular officials working from the Embassy of the protecting power, which we propose should be Italy.

8. We are not at present advising the British community to leave Libya. The British community should stay at home and keep in close touch with developments through the BBC World Service. or through instructions of British consuls.

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SECRET

HOME SECRETARY'S STATEMENT

I want first to endorse what the Minister of State has said about what happened last Tuesday. It was a barbaric outrage. It is inconceivable that following it, normal relations between this country and Libya could continue. The Police have throughout handled the situation with skill and patie n ce. The position on the ground remains unchanged.

All Libyan diplomatic staff and anyone else currently in the Libyan People's Bureau in St. James's Square will now be required to leave the country. They can do so, if they wish, at any time; but they are required to do so within 7 days. The Police will satisfy themselves that anyone emerging from the Bureau is not carrying arms and explosives with them when they leave the premises and that the premises are safe and secure.

As far as other Libyans in this country are concerned, I shall look carefully at any evidence that their presence is against the national interest and will not hesitate to use my powers of removal if I am satisfied that it is. Any applications for extensions of stay will be scrutinised with the greatest care. Applications for visas to travel to the United Kingdom from Libya will, for the time being, need to be made in neighbouring states. All such applications, and those from Libyans elsewhere in the world, will be referred to London and will be thoroughly and carefully examined. Those already holding extant visas will similarly be scrutinised with great care if they seek actually to enter this country. I would advise those holding such visas to re-apply in view of the current situation.

/These measures

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These measures will ensure that in the coming months only in the most exceptional circumstances will Libyan nationals be admitted to this country. In view of the outrage which has occurred and the severence of diplomatic relations, I am sure that such steps will have widespread support.
I shall keep these arrangements under close review, and we shall further review our visa policy with regard to Libyan nationals in the light of the developing situation.

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The Home Secretary's statement

I want first to endorse what the Minister of State has said about what happened last Tuesday. It was a barbaric outrage. It is inconceivable that following it normal relations between this country and Libya could continue.

The police have throughout handled the situation with exemplary speed, skill and patience. The position on the ground remains unchanged.

All Libyan diplomats and anyone else currently in their diplomatic premises will now be required to leave the country. They can do so, if they wish, at any time; but they are required to do so within 7 days. The police will satisfy themselves that anyone emerging from the Bureau is not carrying arms and explosives with them when they leave the premises and that the premises are safe and secure.

As far as other Libyans in this country are concerned, I shall look carefully at any evidence that their presence is against the national interest and will not hesitate to use my powers of removal if I am satisfied that it is. Any applications for extensions of stay will be scrutinised with the greatest care.

Applications for visas to travel to the United Kingdom from Libya will, for the time being, need to be made in neighbouring states. All such applications, and those from Libyans elsewhere in the world, will be referred to London and will be thoroughly and carefully examined. Those already holding extant visas will similarly be scrutinised with great care if they seek actually to enter this country. I would advise those holding such visas to re in view of the current situation.

These measures will ensure that in the coming months only in the most exceptional circumstances will Libyan nationals be admitted to this country. In view of the outrage which has occurred, and the severance of diplomatic relations, I am sure that these steps will have widespread support. I shall keep these arrangements under close review, and I will shortly further review our visa policy with regard to Libyan nationals in the light of the developing situation.

[SECRET]

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FINAL

STATEMENT BY THE HOME SECRETARY, THE RT HON LEON BRITTAN QC MP

I want first to endorse what the Minister of State has said about what happened last Tuesday. It was a barbaric outrage. It is inconceivable that following it normal relations between this country and Libya could continue.

The police have throughout handled the situation with exemplary skill and patience. The position on the ground remains unchanged.

All Libyan diplomatic staff in London and anyone else currently in the Libyan People's Bureau in St James's Square will now be required to leave the country. They can do so, if they wish, at any time; but they are required to do so within 7 days. The police will satisfy themselves that anyone emerging from the Bureau is not carrying arms and explosives with them when they leave the premises and then that the premises are safe and secure.

As far as other Libyans in this country are concerned, I shall look carefully at any evidence that their presence is against the national interest and will not hesitate to use my powers of removal if I am satisfied that it is. Any applications for extensions of stay will be scrutinised with the greatest care.

Applications for visas to travel to the United Kingdom from Libya will, for the time being, need to be made in neighbouring states. All such applications, and those from Libyans elsewhere in the world, will be referred to London and will be thoroughly and carefully examined. Those already holding extant visas will similarly be scrutinised with great care if they seek actually to enter this country. I would advise those holding such visas to reapply in view of the current situation.

These measures will ensure that in the coming months only in the most exceptional circumstances will Libyan nationals be admitted to this country. In view of the outrage which has occurred, and the severance of diplomatic relations, I am sure that these steps will have widespread support. I shall keep these arrangements under close review, and we shall further review our visa policy with regard to Libyan nationals in the light of the developing situation.

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CF

I have spoken to the press office.

DMB 24/4

10 DOWNING STREET

David.

Press Office have asked which message this tel. refers to.

TC.

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4

SECRET

GRS 80
SECRET
FM RABAT 221230Z APR 84
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 87 OF 22 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, ALGIERS, UKMIS NEW YORK,
TRIPOLI, GOVERNOR HONG KONG FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY,
ABU DHABI

YOUR TELNO 49: LIBYAN CRISIS

1. I WAS ABLE TO ARRANGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO BE PUT BEFORE KING HASSAN IN FEZ AT 2100 LAST NIGHT. NO REACTION AS YET, THOUGH MINISTER OF ROYAL PROTOCOL, TO WHOM WE DELIVERED COPIES OF THE MESSAGE IN RABAT THIS MORNING, VOLUNTEERED THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH AN OUTRAGE THAT CAN NOT BE CONDONED.

CAMBRIDGE

LIBYAN CRISIS

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LEGAL ADVISERS

MR EGERTON
CABINET OFFICE

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BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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10 DOWNING STREET

David.

Mrs Gandhi's reply to Prime Minister's message.

Sue
23.4.84.

Message passed to Chequers on 23.4.84.
SMH.

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LIBYAN CRISIS

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PS/L[illegible] Young
PS/M[illegible]TNEY
PS/PUS
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
~~MR WRIGHT~~
MR EGERTON
MR ADAMS
~~SIR J LEAHY~~
CHIEF CLERK
MR WHITE
Sir J Bullard
HD/NENAD
HD/MAED
HD/DEFENCE
HD/PUSD
HD/CONSULAR
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Pol Dep
RESIDENT CLERK

HOME OFFICE
No.10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE BRIEFING ROOM
DS11 MOD
DS C, MOD
RESIDENT CLERK, MOD

MR FREELAND
MRS DENZA
} LEGAL ADVISERS

8

SENT 22 APR 1984

ZZ TRIPOLI

ZZ HONG KONG

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY

GRS 120
SECRET
FM NEW DELHI 220750Z APR 84
TO FLASH FCO LONDON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 326 OF 22 APRIL 1984
INFO FLASH TRIPOLI, GOVERNOR HONG KONG (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 325 : LIBYAN CRISIS

GHAREKHAN HAS JUST GIVEN ME MRS GANDHI'S REPLY DATED 21 APRIL TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE

NEW DELHI,
APRIL 21 1984

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NEW DELHI,
APRIL 21, 1984

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE REGARDING THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU INCIDENT.

WE HAVE SPOKEN TO THE SECRETARY OF THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU IN DELHI AND HAVE INSTRUCTED OUR AMBASSADOR IN TRIPOLI TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH YOUR AMBASSADOR THERE. WE SHALL DO WHATEVER WE CAN TO HELP. IT IS GOOD THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE LIBYAN AUTHORITIES. I DO HOPE THAT THE CRISIS WILL BE OVER WITHOUT FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE.

THE RT. HON. MARGARET THATCHER,
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,
LONDON.

UNQUOTE

WADE-GERY

NNNN

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subject

cc Master

TOP SECRET

NOTE FOR THE RECORD: ACTION POINTS ARISING FROM CHEQUERS MEETING ON 20 APRIL 1984

The main purpose of the meeting held at Chequers at 1930 on 20 April 1984 was to bring the Prime Minister up to date with developments in the crisis in Anglo/Libyan relations which had been sparked off by the shooting incident in St. James's Square on 17 April. The meeting was attended by the Home Secretary, the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Luce) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

In the course of the meeting, the Prime Minister asked for action to be taken on the following points once the immediate crisis had passed:-

(i)

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(ii) The FCO should produce a report on the accreditation of diplomats in this country. This report should cover in particular the following points:-

(a) how do we decide who should be accredited as a diplomat, and who takes the decision;

(b) is there any element of reciprocity between the number of diplomats allowed in London, and the number of diplomats which we are allowed in the corresponding foreign capital;

(c) what is the policy on diplomatic status of premises, and why in particular did the Libyans have four separate immune establishments in London, including a garage?

(iii) Why did first reports from Tripoli suggest that our Ambassador and his staff had evacuated the Embassy, when later this proved not to have been the case?

DMB

21 April 1984

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6A

FM TRIPOLI 211105Z APR
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 203 OF 21/4/84
AND TO FLASH HONG KONG (FOR P.S./SUSFCA)

MY TWO IPTS: ANGLO/LIBYAN RELATIONS

1. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, I DO NOT THINK THAT TRAIKI IS USING DELAYING TACTICS ON US (YOUR PARA 6). ALTHOUGH AWARE OF OUR PROBLEM IN LONDON, NOW THAT I HAVE DONE MY BEST TO BRING IT HOME TO HIM, HE WANTS TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE TO LIBYA BY PREVENTING A BREACH IN RELATIONS. IF HE SENDS A TRUSTED MAN THERE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO GET OUR POINT ACROSS MORE FORCEFULLY. HIS READINESS TO SEE ME DAILY CAN HARDLY BE DESCRIBED AS DELAY BUT IF HE IS DELAYING AT ALL, IT IS FOR REASONS RELATED TO HIS INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES, AND PERHAPS AS AN OBJECTIVE, BECAUSE HE DOES NOT WANT A BREACH, NOT AS A TACTIC.

2. NOTHING TRAIKI HAS SAID THROWS MUCH LIGHT ON THE POINT IN YOUR PARA 8, BUT MY OWN ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE "CONTINUED USE OF THE LPB AS A BASE" IS NOBODY'S OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE WILD MEN WERE PERFECTLY PREPARED TO RISK LOSING THE BASE IF THEY COULD MAKE A BIG BANG IN THE PROCESS. IN ANY CASE, THEY DO NOT NEED SUCH A BASE AS THE LATEST HEATHROW INCIDENT (IF INDEED IT IS LIBYAN) SHOWS. THE CONFLICT IS BETWEEN THE SOBER HEADS WHO WANT TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE AND THE WILD MEN WHO ARE OUT FOR BLOOD.

3. ON THE SAFETY OF BRITISH SUBJECTS AND OF MY OWN STAFF, I HAVE ALREADY GIVEN THE OPINION IN A TELEPRINTER CONVERSATION WITH SIR JOHN LEAHY THAT NON-RESIDENT REPRESENTATION WOULD BE GREATLY PREFERABLE TO A BREACH, WHETHER NEGOTIATED OR UNILATERAL.

MILES

LIBYAN CRISIS

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GRS 750 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM TRIPOLI 211040Z APR
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 201 OF 21/4/84
AND TO FLASH HONG KONG (PS/SOSFCA)

YOUR TELNO 168: ANGLO /LIBYAN RELATIONS.

SUMMARY.

1. ANOTHER FRIENDLY MEETING WITH TRAIKI. NO NEW PROPOSALS FROM EITHER SIDE. NO CHANGE IN PRESS LINE.

DETAIL.

2. I SAW TRAIKI AGAIN, THIS TIME AT THE FOREIGN LIAISON BUREAU. JERRI WAS PRESENT. BEGINNING WITH SOME PERSONAL COMMENTS, I REMINDED TRAIKI THAT HIS FIRST RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR A BREACH IN RELATIONS WAS TO ASK WHETHER IT WAS A PROPOSAL OR A DECISION, AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT IT WAS A PROPOSAL. THE LIBYAN COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY , HOWEVER, WAS A DECISION, OF WHICH WE TOOK NOTE. AS I HAD SAID AT OUR MEETING ON 19 APRIL, OUR IMMEDIATE AND URGENT PROBLEM AROSE FROM THE MURDER AND WE MUST FIND AN ADEQUATE SOLUTION FOR IT QUICKLY.

3. I THEN SPOKE ON THE LINES OF PARAS 3 AND 4 OF YOUR TUR, LEAVING HIM A PIECE OF PAPER INCORPORATING ALL THE SUBSTANCE VERBATIM. I DID NOT USE THE DISCRETIONARY SENTENCE AT THE END OF PARA 4 IN VIEW OF TRAIKI'S REACTION.

4. TRAIKI SAID THAT WE HAD MADE A PROPOSAL TO SOLVE OUR PROBLEM AND THE LIBYANS HAD PUT FORWARD AN IDEA WHICH, THOUGH I CORRECTLY DESCRIBED IT AS A DECISION, WAS INTENDED TO HELP. IF OUR PROPOSAL FOR A BREACH WAS THE ONLY SOLUTION WE COULD ACCEPT, THEN WE COULD ENTER INTO A DISCUSSION ON MODALITIES. BUT THE LIBYAN SIDE REGARDED SUCH A DECISION AS PAINFUL AND UNNECESSARY.

5. HE NOTED WITH APPRECIATION THAT WE WERE READY TO SUBMIT DOCUMENTS TO THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY WHICH WOULD START AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WOULD CONDUCT ITSELF WITH ALL SERIOUSNESS. THE LIBYANS WERE LOOKING FOR A SOLUTION, BUT OUR PROPOSAL WAS THE END OF THE ROAD. IF THERE WERE A FREEZE OR BREACH (HE USED BOTH WORDS) OF RELATIONS, BOTH SIDES WOULD LOSE. THE LIBYANS HAD NO WISH TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCH LOSS. HE ADDED THAT THE FOREIGN LIAISON COMMITTEE (OF WHICH HE IS SECRETARY) DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND THE MATTER WOULD HAVE TO BE REFERRED TO THE PEOPLE'S CONGRESSES, WHICH HE DID NOT RECOMMEND(AND NOR DO I). HE THOUGHT THE LIBYAN COMMISSION WOULD HELP TO CLEAR THE AIR AND HOPED WE WOULD CONTINUE OUR DIALOGUE.

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6. I REPLIED THAT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I COULD SAY THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE HAD NOT CONCLUDED THAT A BREACH IN RELATIONS WAS THE ONLY POSSIBLE OUTCOME. BUT WE WERE STILL LOOKING FOR AN ALTERNATIVE WHICH WOULD SOLVE OUR PROBLEM. I THEN EXPLAINED THAT, WHILE WE DID NOT WISH TO INTERFERE, WE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT FITURI DID NOT HAVE MUCH AUTHORITY. WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE WISE TO SEND SOMEONE WHO HAD TRIPOLI'S FULL CONFIDENCE. TRAIKI SAID HE HOPED THAT HIS DIALOGUE WITH ME WOULD BE THE MAIN CHANNEL OF NEGOTIATION, BUT, AS HE HAD ALREADY TOLD ME, THE LIBYANS INTENDED TO REPLACE FITURI WITH A MAN OF MORE WEIGHT. I EXPLAINED THAT WHAT WE HAD IN MIND WAS FOR THE SHORT TERM, THAT TRAIKI MIGHT SEND A NEGOTIATOR TO LONDON WHO HAD AUTHORITY AND CONTACTS AT THE TOP LEVEL IN TRIPOLI. TRAIKI SAID THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA AND HE WOULD IMPLEMENT IT. I DID NOT MENTION BILQASIM'S NAME, PARTLY BECAUSE I AM NOT CONVINCED THAT HE IS THE RIGHT MAN. WHAT IS NEEDED IS SOMEONE TRAIKI TRUSTS BUT WHO CAN NEVERTHELESS IMPOSE SOME AUTHORITY ON THE WILD MEN, AND TRAIKI IS BEST PLACED TO KNOW IF SUCH A PERSON EXISTS.

7. AFTER WE HAD AGREED THAT WE WOULD MAINTAIN OUR EXISTING LINE WITH THE PRESS, I RAISED OUR CONSULAR POINTS AGAIN AS INSTRUCTED. TRAIKI SAID THAT THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FROM THE AIRPORT WOULD BE SOLVED AS FROM TODAY. HE HOPED TO GET SOMEWHERE ON THE LEDINGHAM CASE, THOUGH WE WERE ALSO HOLDING SOME PRISONERS AND HE THOUGHT IT BEST THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD DO ANYTHING TO INCREASE TENSION JUST AT PRESENT. I SAID I AGREED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL, BUT THE POLICE HAD NEVERTHELESS TO DEAL WITH THOSE THEY SUSPECTED OF BREAKING THE LAW. I MENTIONED CAMPBELL AGAIN AND ASKED FOR TRAIKI'S HELP IN OBTAINING CONSULAR ACCESS.

8. SEE MY TWO IFTS.

ARLES

LIBYAN CRISIS

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FROM: FCO, EMERGENCY UNIT
DATE: 21 April 1984

David Barclay Esq, No 10 Downing Street

Dear Barclay,

You asked what offers of help had been received from friendly governments during the current crisis with Libya.

We have had specific offers of help at the highest level from President Zaid of Abu Dhabi and from the UN Secretary-General.

We have also had expressions of sympathy and offers of help from a number of other governments at Ministerial and diplomatic level. These include Ghana and Kuwait whose Ambassadors in Tripoli have been in direct touch with our Ambassador; and Canada, Belgium, India and Turkey, who have responded helpfully to demarches from our posts. The Turks said that they would like to help but that they had their own difficulties with the Libyans and they were not convinced that Qadhafi would react favourably to intervention by third parties.

As you know, we have also been keeping our partners in the Ten closely informed, and have asked them to do what they can in their own judgement to help the Libyans to see reason. It may be a complex matter to organise an agreed demarche by the Ten as a whole: among other things, the Italians have agreed to act as protecting power, and will need to preserve their neutrality. But individual action by those of the Ten who are effectively represented in Tripoli will, no doubt, be forthcoming and useful.

Yours sincerely
Christopher Long

21 April 1984

C W Long
Emergency Unit

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• Home Secretary's Statement 21.4.84.

Approved by PM

night's bomb at Heathrow Terminal 2. No connection with the shooting in St James's Square has been established.

"Every decent person will want to express their revulsion at this latest terrorist outrage which has injured wholly innocent bystanders. Our sympathy goes out to the victims.

After the shooting in St James's Square the police have maintained a special alert, but there could be no way of guaranteeing that no further incidents would occur short of bringing the life of the capital to a halt. The police alert will of course continue.

Police investigations are being pursued vigorously but at present we do not know who was responsible for last

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X 17

6 Duplicate.

21.4.84

OPTIONS

This note sets out the options available to us if the current exchanges with the Libyans do not result in an early resolution of the problem. A basic assumption made throughout is that the Libyan government will take the same, or more severe, measures against our diplomatic staff and other British nationals there as we take against Libyans in the United Kingdom. Another assumption is that it will not prove practicable or negotiable with the Libyans to apprehend the murderer of the woman police constable, however desirable that may be.

Objectives

Our objectives are as follows -

(a) to secure the departure from the United Kingdom of the Libyans in the People's Bureau;

(b) to satsify ourselves that the People's Bureau and the other diplomatic premises hitherto occupied by the Libyans contain, when vacated, no firearms or explosives, and that they cannot be reoccupied by the Libyans;

(c) to make clear our abhorrence of terrorist activities and, in particular, of the murder of the woman police constable, and to demonstrate to the world at large that acts of state terrorism will not be tolerated and cannot be carried out with impunity;

(d) to ensure the safe return of our Embassy staff from Tripoli, and that other British people and British interests in Libya are exposed to the minimum of risk;

(e) to secure the release of British people detained in Libya since the incident.

Options

(a) Do nothing in London in the hope that the Libyans will in time accede to our requests. This is the course currently being pursued. The other options described below are essentially alternatives to this.

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Advantage: no obvious immediate risks.

Disadvantage: possibility of renewed Libyan terrorist activity; drain on police resources; disruption in London; the public will demand more positive action, so it has a time limit, probably of Tuesday evening 24 April.

(b) Attempt to persuade the Libyans to accede to our requests by other negotiating methods, eg

i. the use of a mediator

Advantages: May have more effect on Libya; shows United Kingdom Government willingness and reasonableness; demonstrates new initiative and action to Press and public.

Disadvantages: Will increase time taken; weakens United Kingdom control on events; likely to lead to unsatisfactory outcome (eg return to status quo).

ii. remove diplomatic staff on both sides leaving the question of breaking diplomatic relations aside for the time being.

Advantages: Achieves some objectives for British in Libya; minimises risks to them if carefully negotiated.

Disadvantages: Fails to achieve other objectives in London of clearing out Libyans, removing weapons, gaining access to their buildings and signalling public abhorrence.

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(c) Withdraw the families of Embassy staff from Tripoli and/or some Embassy staff. Already under consideration by FCO.

Advantages: To the extent that it is achieved, it reduces the number of our citizens at risk there.

Disadvantages: Does not achieve any objectives; a method rather than an alternative option, and only a staging post to some other solution.

(d) Announce an intention to break diplomatic relations unilaterally if no satisfactory response received from the Libyans by a given time. HMA already authorised to hint at this if judged opportune.

Advantages: Puts pressure on Libyan authorities; goes some way to meeting public demands now building up for what everyone expects.

Disadvantages: Unless judged that Libya would be prepared to acquiesce, will provoke Libyan reprisals (eg possible attack on British Embassy, detention of British nationals); does not of itself get Libyans out of Bureau.

(e) Break diplomatic relations unilaterally. This is the main alternative to which events may be moving.

Advantages: Meets public demands for this; paves the way for coercive measures against the People's Bureau; gives the Libyans an incentive to leave the People's Bureau.

Disadvantages: Immediate Libyan reprisals; possible refusal of the Libyans to let our people out of Tripoli; does not necessarily resolve the problem at the People's Bureau.

This option comes down in effect to questions of how best to manage it, both in Libya, with world opinion and on the ground in London. Questions of timing are also important, because many preparatory steps need to be taken over the next few days if it is to be ready for implementation by, say, Wednesday morning.

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A unilateral break in relations could occur in two sets of circumstances -

(1) with Libyan understanding, even though they disapproved, to the extent that they withdrew their people from London and allowed ours to leave Libya. That would achieve our objectives, and the main need would be for a Press Conference to explain to the world the circumstances in which we were taking this action, which was our right.

or

(2) with Libyan opposition, which could result in either -

(i) their people remaining in the Bureau and ours not being allowed to leave Libya;

or

(ii) ours being allowed to leave, but theirs remaining in the Bureau.

2(ii) would obviously be preferable, but either event would fail to achieve our main objectives of getting the Libyans out of London with bags and baggage.

In either event it would be necessary to mobilise world opinion to bring further pressure to bear on Libya and eg the Security Council might be convened. Italy would need to be approached to take over protection of British people in Libya.

Further action against those in the Bureau would also need to be considered. This could take the form of a steadily escalating set of sanctions described below. The lesser sanctions near the start of the list could <u>in any event</u> be applied <u>at any time</u> if it was desired to increase the pressure on those in bureau.

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(f)

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(g) After a break in diplomatic relations, and after diplomatic immunity has expired, institute a siege of the People's Bureau (ie allow no one in, allow no supplies, arrest anyone who comes out, cut off gas, electricity, water, communications - all accompanied by negotiation).

Advantages: Should be effective;

Disadvantages: Retailiation in Libya; could be protracted.

(h) Use of force, after (f) - eg forcible entry, use of CS gas.

Advantages: Should increase effectiveness of (f), and end the incident in a shorter time.

Disadvantages: Retaliation in Libya.

NB. Any of these options inviting retaliation against British nationals in Libya would make it desirable for military preparations to be made for evacuating them, which would take some days to activate.

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FROM: W A Harrison
Emergency Unit
DATE: 21 April 1984

PS
PS/Mr Luce
PS/Mr Whitney
PS/PUS
Chief Clerk
Sir J Bullard
Sir J Leahy
Mr Wright
Lord N Gordon Lennox
Mr Egerton
Mr Adams
NENAD
News Department
MAED
Consular Department
PUSD
Security Department
Protocol Department
Legal Advisers
No 10 Downing Street
Cabinet Office

LIBYA: SITREP: 2000 20 April to 0800 21 April 1984

1. A quiet night on the diplomatic front.

Instructions to Tripoli

2. Instructions were despatched to Tripoli last night following approval from the Prime Minister instructing Mr Miles to make a further approach to Traiki. He was unable to get an appointment last night and is expected to do so this morning. He will say that we are glad to hear that the Libyan authorities regret the shooting incident. We have noted the Libyan decision to appoint a high level Commission of Investigation but wish to point out that the LPB is not Libyan territory. Incidents which take place in the UK are subject to UK jurisdiction. Mr Miles has discretion to say that, speaking for himself, he is concerned that if an agreed solution cannot be quickly reached HMG may unilaterally break diplomatic relations. Mr Miles is also instructed to try to speed up the negotiations without giving the Libyans the impression that they have got us under time pressure. The Secretary of State approved these instructions by telegram from Hong Kong.

/Bomb

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Bomb At Terminal 2

3. Last night's bomb explosion at Terminal 2 Heathrow is under investigation by the Police. They have detained two Libyan students who were found in Terminal 2 after it had been cleared by the Police. So far the Press have reported only that two people are helping Police with their inquiries and their nationality is not to be generally known. The Cabinet Office, with our consent, will discreetly inform British Caledonian that those arrested are Libyan in case this should affect their decision to fly into Tripoli today. (British Caledonian have taken this decision against Government advice.)

UN Secretary General

4. Sir J Thomson has reported that the UN Secretary General, who is currently in Majorca, has offered to help in any way he can. The offer has been made in terms which suggest that Senor Perez de Cuellar would not be at all offended if we turned it down.

Consular

5. There is nothing of interest to report on the Consular front overnight.

Alistair Harrison

W A Harrison
Emergency Unit

21 April 1984

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Reference

FROM: J Clark
Consular
Emergency Unit

DATE: 20 April 1984

PS
PS/Mr Luce
PS/Mr Whitney
PS/PUS
C hief Clerk
Sir J Bullard
Sir J Leahy
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Mr Egerton
Mr Adams
Mr Wright
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No 10 Downing Street ✓
Cabinet Office

LIBYA: CONSULAR SITREP: 1800 HRS 20 APRIL 1984

Detainees

1. We have heard nothing further from our Embassy on Messrs Ledingham and Campbell (see however para 3).

2. A quiet day. Only about twenty calls received. These are fairly divided between those about persons already in Libya and those enquiring whether they should go there. We are still advising people not to travel unless their journey is absolutely essential.

British Caledonian Flights

3. Ian Ritchie of British Caledonian (B Cal) telephoned. Their flight BR 333 arrived Tripoli on time at 1320 hrs. The Captain reported no problems. There were 22 passengers on the flight, 11 of whom were British nationals. The Captain will try to find out on the return leg if any of his passengers include persons prevented from leaving on the B Cal flight on 19 April. B Cal believe their telephones in Tripoli to be monitored. There would be a board meeting at 0900 hrs Tuesday 24 April when the detention of Mr Ledingham would be discussed. If he had not been released by then, the board would probably ask the Minister for a statement on their employee's detention.

Useful tel nos Ian Ritchie home tel: 040381-2412
B Cal Movements Controller 0293-27890

/The

CODE 18-77

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The B Cal flight from Tripoli has now landed. The Captain reported no problems. There were 20 passengers. B Cal will let us know the number of Britons on board.

pp James Clark

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FROM: N F McDUFF

CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT

DATE: 20 APRIL 1984

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PS/Mr Whitney
PS/PUS
Chief Clerk
Sir J Bullard
Sir J Leahy
Lord N Gordon Lennox
Mr Egerton
Mr Adams
Mr Wright
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News Dept
MAED
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LIBYA: CONSULAR SITREP: 0600 20 April and 1200 20 April 1984

Detainees

1. There is no further news about Messrs Ledingham and Campbell.

Enquiries from the Public

2. A quiet morning. Only about a dozen calls received altogether. Calls were fairly evenly divided between those about persons already in Libya and those enquiring whether they should go there. We are still advising people not to travel unless their journey is absolutely essential.

British Caledonian Flights

3. A B Cal aircraft successfully flew in and out of Tripoli yesterday 19 April. However, 6 UK Passport Holders were refused leave to board the aircraft by Libyan immigration authorities. Other UKPHs travelled on the flight. There is thus no blanket ban on UKPHs wishing to leave. It is not known on what basis the decision to refuse the 6 was taken.

/4.

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4. B Cal Movements Control inform us that the next flight will be tomorrow, 21 April. Bookings so far are 28 persons London-Tripoli and 26 persons Tripoli-London.

N F McDuff
Emergency Unit

20 April 1984

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LORD N GORDON LENNOX
MR WRIGHT
MR EGERTON
MR ADAMS
SIR J LEAHY
CHIEF CLERK
MR WHITE
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MAED
HD/DEFENCE
HD/PUSD
HD/CONSULAR
HD/NEWS
HD/SECURITY
HD/PROTOCOL
PS/PUS
RESIDENT CLERK

HOME OFFICE
No.10 DOWNING ST
CABINET OFFICE BRIEFING ROOM
DS11 MOD
DS C, MOD
RESIDENT CLERK, MOD

MR FREELAND
MRS DENZA
} LEGAL ADVISERS

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20 APR 1984

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 202100Z APR 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 409 OF 20 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE TRIPOLI

FOLLOWING FOR EMERGENCY UNIT.

LIBYA

1. THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL (AT PRESENT IN MAJORCA) HAS SENT ME A MESSAGE VIA URQUHART. IT IS THAT HE CONTINUES TO BE VERY UPSET AND SHOCKED ABOUT THE LIBYAN ACTION IN LONDON AND WISHES TO REITERATE THAT HE WOULD BE MORE THAN READY TO TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH YOU CONSIDER USEFUL. HE IMAGINES THAT THERE IS NOTHING HE CAN USEFULLY DO AND HE IS CERTAINLY NOT LOOKING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVENE OFFICIALLY. IF HE IS ASKED TO TAKE ACTION IT WOULD NOT BE AN EXERCISE OF 'GOOD OFFICES' BUT A PERSONAL INTERVENTION WITH TREIKI WHO HE KNOWS VERY WELL.

2. AS YOU KNOW, PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS BOTH ANGLOPHILE AND GRATEFUL FOR HIS RECENT VISIT TO LONDON. I AM SURE HIS OFFER IS GENUINE AND I AM EQUALLY SURE THAT HE WILL NOT BE UPSET IF THE REPLY IS 'THANKS, BUT NOTHING THAT CAN USEFULLY BE DONE AT PRESENT.' IT WOULD, HOWEVER, BE A GOOD THING TO SEND HIM SOME REPLY. I CAN ARRANGE THIS THROUGH URQUHART.

3. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, I ALSO KNOW TREIKI FAIRLY WELL. HE IS AN ENGAGING ROGUE, EQUALLY READY WITH A LIE AND A JOKE. HE IS UNSCRUPULOUS BUT A MAN OF TALENTS. HE IS NOT IN PRINCIPLE ANTI-BRITISH AS HE IS ANTI-AMERICAN. HE HAS SEVERAL TIMES, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, ANNOUNCED HIS REGARD FOR MY IMPARTIALITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IN NEW YORK AT ANY RATE, THE BEST WAY TO APPROACH HIM WAS ON A STRICTLY FACTUAL, RATIONAL, LOW-KEY NOTE.

THOMSON

NNNN

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RECORD OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE HOME SECRETARY AND THE PRIME MINISTER AT 1530 HOURS ON 20 APRIL 1984

The Home Secretary explained to the Prime Minister the position reached after the morning meeting of COBRA. The Prime Minister had seen the two telegrams (191 and 192) from Tripoli that morning.

In discussion of the objectives, the Prime Minister said that our three basic requirements were for all the Libyans in the LPB to leave the country, for our own diplomatic staff to be brought home and for the LPB building to be made safe. The Prime Minister agreed with the Home Secretary that it was unlikely to be sufficient to seal off the LPB after an evacuation, because of the dnager of explosives deteriorating.

The Home Secretary said that arguably we should not be too concerned if the Libyans used the device of the diplomatic bag to take their arms and explosives out of the country. We had after all already accepted that we would have to allow a murderer to go free. The Prime Minister did not dissent from this view. She suggested that, if the Libyans continued to object to a search even after the diplomatic bags had left, we might arrange for the building to be examined by a third party acceptable to both sides - for example, an Italian expert from their NATO staff. Such a search could take place in the presence of a Libyan representative.

Commenting more generally, the Prime Minister said that it was important not to appear to help the Libyans too much. In terms of public relations, we needed something to announce tomorrow (Saturday). This could, for example, be the arrival of a Libyan emissary if that were thought desirable in the context of the diplomatic negotiations.

It was agreedthat the Home Secretary would report further to the Prime Minister after the next meeting of COBRA.

20 April 1984

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TO FLASH TRIPOLI
TELEGRAM NUMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 210001Z GOVERNOR HONG KONG FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY ~~AND LIBYA CRISIS DISTRIBUTION~~

YOUR TELSNOS 191 AND 192: ANGLO/LIBYAN RELATIONS

1. Thank you for these clear reports and for your own interesting suggestions.

2. We must not lose sight of our central concern in this which is to resolve as quickly as possible the problems created by the shooting from the Libyan People's Bureau (LPB) in St James's Square. We stand by the proposals we have already put to the Libyans (which we note have not (not) been rejected). However, setting aside for the moment the question of our official relations, our minimum requirements are three:

(A) that all the current occupants of the LPB should leave the UK:

(B) that our own diplomatic staff should leave Libya in safety: and

(C)

Em Unit

Libyan Crisis

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(C) that we should be satisfied that all weapons and explosives have been removed from the LPB and that the building will no longer be capable of being used as a base for terrorist acts.

We must focus the attention of the Libyan authorities on the fact that the short-term problem which they have created requires an urgent and adequate solution.

3. Please now seek an urgent further meeting with Traiki and confirm to us as soon as you have an appointment. We assume that this may be possible during the course of tomorrow morning 21 April. Subject to any comments from the S of S's party in Hong Kong you should then speak as follows in response to what Traiki said to you this morning. You should say that the latest Libyan ideas have been discussed here. We are glad to hear that the Libyan authorities regret the shooting incident. We note Traiki's remark that the Libyans had not ordered the firing or any use of weapons. None the less there could be no doubt that shots were fired from the LPB on the morning of 17 April which killed a police-woman and injured law-abiding demonstrators and that this poses a grave problem which requires a speedy and definitive solution. We have noted the Libyan decision to appoint a high-level commission of investigation. You should however point out that the LPB is not (not) Libyan territory but under the normal rules of international law remains the territory of the host country but entitled to inviolability in accordance with the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations to which we are both parties. We should none the less be prepared to supply documentary material relating to the shooting incident to the Libyan Commission of Investigation in Tripoli. But incidents which ~~take place in the United Kingdom notwithstanding any diplomatic immunity that may exist in a particular case. It is for this reason that the legal investigation of the death of the~~

take place

~~police woman~~

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword

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